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ABSTRACT 
 In this thesis, I analyze the reasons that Supreme Court overturns precedent, and 
how, if at all, does the doctrine of stare decisis impact those decisions. The Supreme 
Court’s decisions are often politicized and viewed as a result of the Supreme Court 
Justices’ ideological views. Simply, they abide by precedents they agree with and 
abandon ones they do not. While the impact of ideology on Supreme Court decisions is 
unclear, I find that the doctrine of stare decisis plays an important role in their 
jurisprudence. In fact, the doctrine of stare decisis has increasingly dominated cases that 
reverse a prior Supreme Court decision. Modern iterations of the Supreme Court discuss 
stare decisis in more detail than their predecessors. The Supreme Court’s treatment of 
precedent varies over time; however, its general reverence for stare decisis will likely 
persist in the future.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, Donald Trump won the presidential election in what will likely be 
remembered as one of the most shocking and unanticipated victories in American 
political history. With Justice Scalia’s seat still unfilled on the Supreme Court during the 
presidential election, many conservatives saw Donald Trump’s success as a guarantee of 
a conservative Supreme Court. In fact, poll data shows that 26% of all Donald Trump 
voters said that filling the empty Supreme Court seat with a conservative drove their 
decision to vote for Donald Trump.1  
Donald Trump’s election caused anxiety among liberal voters about the future of Roe 
v. Wade, the Supreme Court’s controversial 1973 decision. During the Senate 
confirmation hearings of Neil Gorsuch, Justice Scalia’s successor, the Senate Democrats 
grilled him on his views of Roe v. Wade and the reproductive rights of women. During 
Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, Senator Durbin asked Gorsuch whether he accepted the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe.2 This question is shrouded in a lack of confidence in 
stability within the judiciary. Senator Durbin’s question expresses the theory that stare 
decisis, or the judiciary’s general respect for prior decisions, is not strongly abided by in 
the Supreme Court and is influenced by judges’ personal political beliefs.  
My findings in this thesis are multi-faceted. By analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making process for abandoning or obeying stare decisis, I determine that 
 
1 Jane Coaston, “Polling Data Shows Republicans Turned Out for Trump in 2016 because of the Supreme 
Court,” Vox, 29 Jun. 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29/17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-
republicans-kennedy-retire. 
2 Matt Ford, “Gorsuch: Roe v. Wade is the ‘Law of the Land,’” The Atlantic, 22 Mar. 2017 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/neil-gorsuch-confirmation-hearing/520425/. 
 
 8 
individual Supreme Court Justices vary their views on stare decisis by case. However, 
the Supreme Court, as an institution, generally maintains reasonable and clear 
justifications for overturning precedent over time, though there are a few discrepancies. 
Throughout my research, I find that the legal theory of stare decisis differs dramatically 
from the Supreme Court’s practical approach. Furthermore, I argue that the Supreme 
Court highly values precedent as evidenced by their use of precedent in their 
abandonment of stare decisis. Overall, stare decisis is an important, and generally 
adhered to, doctrine for the Supreme Court more so now than it has ever previously been 
in American history.  
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CHAPTER 1 
History of Stare Decisis 
 
To understand the significance and purpose of stare decisis, it is crucial to learn the 
origins of this legal principle. Although many legal scholars, such as Justice Scalia, credit 
the emergence of stare decisis to English common law, the practice of abiding by 
previous decisions only arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the English 
courts.3 Hamilton, however, spoke of judicial precedent in Federalist No. 78 in 1787. He 
said, “To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be 
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty 
in every particular case that comes before them.”4 Thus, it is likely that the principle of 
stare decisis emerged simultaneously in English and American legal systems. 
Despite Hamilton’s discussion of precedent in the Federalist Papers in 1788, stare 
decisis was not practiced widely in the early years of the Supreme Court. According to a 
study written by political scientists, Professor Timothy Johnson, Professor James Spriggs, 
and Paul Wahlbeck, U.S. Supreme Court cases were only cited in later cases 4.3% of the 
time between 1791 to 1815. The U.S. Supreme Court does cite English common law 
51.8% of the time.5  The Court largely relied on English common law, and not previous 
Supreme Court decisions. This does not necessarily indicate nonobservance of stare 
 
3 Thomas R. Lee, “Stare Decisis in the Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist 
Court,” Vanderbilt Law Review 52, no. 3 (1999): 661. 
4 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Gary Wills (New York: Bantam 
Classics, 1982): 399. 
5 Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, “The Origin and Development of Stare 
Decisis at the U.S. Supreme Court,” Law Explorer, November 9, 2015. 
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decisis because there were not many Supreme Court decisions to abide by from 1791 to 
1815. Thus, the Court relied on precedent set by Great Britain. In a way, the Court 
recognized the importance of stare decisis by respecting the decisions and laws of 
England, which helped form many of the laws in the United States. The Court was not 
merely creating entirely new interpretations of laws, but relying on familiar sources 
(English common law) to understand the meaning of U.S. laws. As time goes on, there 
becomes more relevant precedent that the U.S. Supreme Court can rely on; thus, the 
Supreme Court more frequently cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent and fewer English 
common laws.6 
According to a prominent English judge, William Blackstone, a significant purpose 
for the doctrine of stare decisis is to ensure that laws are not “liable to waver with every 
new judge's opinion.”7 While this prevented inconsistency and constant changes in the 
law, it also assured the public that the judiciary’s decisions were impartial. Some political 
historians view the development of stare decisis as a tool for legitimacy. In their study, 
Professor Johnson, Spriggs and Paul Wahlbeck argue that “judges, desirous of increasing 
their policy-making authority, fostered stare decisis as a way to legitimize the judiciary 
and to insulate it from outside political attack…It is also consistent with some historical 
work on the Marshall Court era, which contends that Chief Justice Marshall emphasized 
the rule of law as a way to bolster the Court’s authority.”8  
Despite the general consensus of the history and purpose of stare decisis, it is still 
unclear under what circumstances the Court can overturn precedents. Some argue that the 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Lee, “Historical Perspective,” 662. 
8 Johnson, “Origin and Development,” 
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Supreme Court should not ever apply strong precedential standards to prior cases. Justice 
Clarence Thomas, for example, recently encouraged the Supreme Court to abandon any 
prior decision that they considered to be wrong.9 Still, others argue that the Supreme 
Court should respect precedent, except in extreme circumstances. Many legal scholars, 
including Professor Randy Kozel of Notre Dame Law School, describe judicial precedent 
as “indispensable”10 because of its promotion of “individual liberty by fostering 
impersonality, stability, and constraint.”11 So while stare decisis is a long-established 
American legal tradition, there remains significant controversy over its usage and 
justifications. 
  
 
9 Jonathan Stempel, “Justice Thomas urges U.S. Supreme Court to Feel Free to Reverse Precedents,” 
Reuters, 17 Jun 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-thomas/justice-thomas-urges-us-
supreme-court-to-feel-free-to-reverse-precedents-idUSKCN1TI2KJ. 
10 Randy J. Kozel, “Precedent and Constitutional Structure,” Northwestern University Law Review 112, no. 
4 (2018):790. 
11 Id., 837. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theories of Stare Decisis 
 
Theories in Favor of Strong Horizontal Judicial Precedent 
Both conservative and liberal scholars tend to put forward more distinct arguments in 
favor of strongly abiding by precedent than against it. Unlike the theories against 
precedent, conservative and liberal scholars generally present similar theories for 
upholding precedent. While certain scholars, such as Steven Calabresi, argue against 
those who believe in the absolute power of precedent, very few people actually believe in 
blindly following precedent. However, they do believe in the legitimate use of previous 
decisions to inform future ones, when appropriate.  
There are several main reasons behind theories of judicial precedent. One of the most 
prevalent theories is consistency and predictability. If a justice could change the meaning 
of the Constitution or of the laws with the stroke of a pen (and the agreement of four 
other justices), society would be unruly. Professor Michael J. Gerhardt explains that, 
“interests of fairness, efficiency, and the enhancement of social interaction require that 
governments and citizens have a reasonably settled sense of what they may and may not 
do.”12 Predictability is essential in American society due to its widely dispersed citizenry. 
In addition to the predictability that American society requires, laws and their meaning 
should not contradict each other depending on the specific litigant. Without precedent, 
justices could very well decide contradictory opinions for similar cases.  
 
12 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18.  
 13 
Those in favor of judicial precedent also argue that precedent is caution. Professor 
Gerhardt clarifies that “the doctrine of precedent …reflects the view that change poses 
unknown risks, and that we generally should prefer the risks we know to those we cannot 
foresee…”13 For the most part, human behavior tends toward certainty than the 
mysterious unknown. This is not to say that the judicial system should never take risks. 
However, the judicial system should weigh the current risks against the potential future 
risks. Overturning precedent presents unknown risks in the law and in society, as a 
whole.  
Following precedent is not only the generally cautious decision, but the expectation 
of precedent also encourages caution among justices. Justices will exercise more caution 
knowing that their decisions will affect millions of Americans in the present and future, 
rather than limited to the specific litigants in the case.14 Justices will be cautious to 
overturn precedent, but also cautious to create precedent. 
Another argument made among scholars is that the following of precedent allows the 
Supreme Court to reduce institutional politicization.15 If the Court could easily overturn 
previous decisions that the majority of Justices on the Court did not politically agree 
with, the Court would be regarded as a political institution. If the Court becomes 
politicized, the Court’s legitimacy could be at stake. 
As stated before, most scholars who argue in favor of judicial precedent do not 
advocate for the supremacy of precedent over the Constitution or constitutional 
interpretation. Professor Akhil Amar, a conservative scholar, says, “We might even not 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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only treat a past precedent as a sort of default or the starting point but even give it a 
certain epistemic weight.”16 Professor Amar argues against Calabresi’s impression of 
precedentalists. Professor Amar views the power of precedent as nonbinding, yet 
significant nonetheless. According to him, precedent is not created by those unaware of 
the Constitution’s fundamental values. Many Justices who have created precedent have 
extensively studied Constitutional law, and they deeply understand its meaning and 
significance. This is not to say that all precedent should be followed. Professor Amar 
exemplifies this point through John Marshall. He says that, “if the precedent came from 
the pen of John Marshall…it might be a very strong reason.”17 In other words, Justices 
should not entirely disregard the understandings and reasonings of previous decisions 
because they were crafted by the foremost Constitutional minds at the time. Chief Justice 
John Marshall is regarded as one of the greatest Justices in United States history, thus, his 
decisions should maintain some weight on the decisions made today.  
Professor David Strauss, a liberal precedentalist, presents a unique argument in favor 
of abiding by precedent. He poses the question, “If someone else were appointing people, 
someone you did not like were appointing people to the Supreme Court, what theory 
would you want them to use?”18 In this case, it makes sense that precedent should be 
valued for political impartiality. Precedent constrains justices to reasonably interpret the 
Constitution. They cannot create a new Constitutional interpretation without explaining 
the diversion from previous interpretations.  
 
16 Akhil, Amar, “Panel on Originalism and Precedent,” in Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate, ed. 
Steven G. Calabresi (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007), 215. 
17 Ibid. 
18 David Strauss, “Panel on Originalism and Precedent,” in Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate, ed. 
Steven G. Calabresi (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007), 217. 
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Another interesting argument in favor put forth by Professor Thomas Merrill 
examines the results of precedent. He says, “a judiciary that stood firm with a strong 
theory of precedent I think would re-channel our nation back toward democratic 
institutions, away from using the judiciary to make social policy.”19 He astutely points 
out that many judges and justices are chosen by the President because of ideological 
alignments as opposed to legal understanding or knowledge. In fact, Presidents have only 
crossed party lines to nominate a Supreme Court Justice 12 times since the Founding, and 
not since President Nixon in 1971.20 The fact that cross-party nominations are incredibly 
rare may indicate political motivations behind judicial nominations. However, the 
judiciary was always intended to be as independent from politics as possible. According 
to Professor Merrill, disallowing justices to make decisions on their constitutional 
interpretation alone, which could be informed by their personal political beliefs, would 
eventually force presidents to adjust how they choose nominees. If executives cannot 
advance their political agenda through nominations, they would begin to evaluate 
potential nominees “on their competences and their legal abilities.”21  
Even those who argue against adherence to judicial precedent concede that precedent 
can often be useful and more beneficial than merely interpreting the law as the judge sees 
 
19 Thomas Merrill, “Panel on Originalism and Precedent,” in Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate, 
ed. Steven G. Calabresi (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007), 227. 
20 President Jefferson, a Democrat-Republican offered his nomination to Charles Lee, a Federalist, which 
he rejected; President Lincoln, a Republican, nominated Stephen Field, a Democrat in 1863; President 
Harrison, a Republican, nominated Howell Edmunds Jackson, a Democrat in 1893; President Taft, a 
Republican, nominated three Democrats, Horace Harmon Lurton in 1909, Edward Douglass White and 
Joseph Rucker Lamar in 1910; President Harding, a Republican nominated Pierce Butler, a Democrat in 
1922; President Hoover, a Republican, nominated Benjamin N. Cardozo, a Democrat in 1932; President 
Franklin Roosevelt, a Democrat, nominated Harlan Stone, a Republican in 1941; President Truman, a 
Democrat, nominated Republican Senator, Harold Hitz Burton in 1945; President Eisenhower, a 
Republican, nominated William J. Brennan, Jr., a Democrat in 1957; and President Nixon, a Republican, 
nominated two Democrats, Clement Haynsworth in 1969 and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. in 1971. 
21 Merrill, “Originalism and Precedent,” 227. 
 16 
fit. For example, Justice Stephen Markman of the Michigan Supreme Court states that, 
“there are considerations that sometimes argue in favor of adherence to precedent, even 
when that precedent is wrong. For example, the longstanding nature of some precedents 
and their effective institutionalization within the law.”22 In other words, it is sometimes 
more convenient to abide by precedent than to overturn it, despite its inaccuracy. This 
inclination to preserve institutional structure and ease indicates pragmatism over a purely 
ideological approach to decision-making.  
 
Theories Against Strong Horizontal Judicial Precedent 
The debate on precedent is a well-balanced and apolitical one. Conservative and 
liberal scholars alike criticize the theories of strict adherence to previous Supreme Court 
decisions. In fact, Justice Black and Justice Scalia, a liberal and conservative 
respectively, are the two Supreme Court Justices who most frequently called for the 
overturning of precedent.23 While there are Supreme Court Justices of both ideological 
leanings who favor a limited approach to obeying stare decisis, legal scholars’ opinions 
are more difficult to pinpoint. Conservative scholars, for example, write more extensively 
on their negative opinions of stare decisis than liberal scholars. Thus, this section reflects 
a more ideologically unbalanced discussion than exists. 
Many conservative Constitutional scholars argue against obedience to stare decisis 
for four main reasons. Firstly, there is no Constitutional provision that requires the 
 
22 Stephen Markman, “Panel on Originalism and Precedent,” in Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate, 
ed. Steven G. Calabresi (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007), 231. 
23 Michael J. Gerhardt, “A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia,” 
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository 74, no. 25 (1994): 33. 
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Supreme Court to take previous Court decisions into account when deciding on a case.24 
In fact, Article VI, paragraph 2 of the Constitution prohibits the Supreme Court, states, 
and political institutions from superseding explicit Constitutional provisions as the 
federal “Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof…shall be the supreme law of the land.”25  
Secondly, scholars, such as Steven Calabresi claim that the Supreme Court tends to 
disobey precedent in landmark Constitutional cases.26 Many long-lasting precedents and 
Constitutional interpretations are ones that overturn previous precedents. For example, 
the current broad interpretations of the Commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses 
resulted from the landmark case West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, which reversed 
the decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital made only 14 years prior.27  
Thirdly, many conservative scholars argue against precedent for pragmatic policy 
purposes. The Founders purposefully made the Constitution exceptionally difficult to 
amend. Two-thirds of both the House and the Senate or of the states within a state 
convention must agree to propose the amendment. If proposed, the amendment must be 
passed with a three-quarters vote of the states or of the state-ratifying conventions.28 If, 
however, Supreme Court interpretation can amend the Constitution, Article V, and thus 
the Founders’ purpose, is easily sidestepped.  
 
24 Calabresi, Steven G, “Panel on Originalism and Precedent,” in Originalism: A Quarter-Century of 
Debate, ed. Steven G. Calabresi (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007), 252.  
25 U.S. Const. Art. VI.  
26 Calabresi, “Panel on Originalism and Precedent,” 204. 
27 Ibid. 
28 U.S. Const. Art. V. 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court’s ability to bind the next generations of the Court strips 
the other two branches of their ability to check the Court’s power through the 
appointment and confirmation of new Justices.29 If the Supreme Court’s decisions must 
be revered above all, the purposeful appointment and confirmation of new Justices who 
would make vastly different decisions would have no meaning. If Supreme Court Justices 
blindly obeyed stare decisis, as some scholars argue in favor of, the impeachment of a 
Supreme Court Justice would not even allow for the overruling of their potentially 
misguided or incorrect decisions. The Constitution clearly grants the executive and the 
legislative branches with power to check the judicial branch. However, the strict view of 
stare decisis would essentially render these checks as futile. 
Fourthly, according to Charles J. Cooper, a prominent conservative attorney and legal 
scholar, precedent is inherently subjective.30 Judges and Supreme Court Justices, alike, 
can manipulate or expand the meaning of precedent by applying it to a dissimilar case. 
Fifthly, Cooper argues that the entire purpose of stare decisis is to protect “error from 
correction.”31 Stare decisis allows judges and Justices to reaffirm erroneous decisions 
instead of correcting them. 
While it tends to be true that there are more conservative scholars who argue against 
the judicial concept of stare decisis, many liberal justices have been more than willing to 
depart from their absolutist stances on precedent. In fact, Cooper wrote “stare decisis has 
always been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals. Its friends, for 
 
29 Calabresi, “Panel on Originalism and Precedent,” 207.  
30 Charles J. Cooper, “Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication,” Cornell Law 
Review 73, no. 2 (January 1988): 404. 
31 Ibid. 
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the most part, are determined by the needs of the moment.”32 According to Cooper, 
liberals and conservative judges adjust their views on stare decisis when it is convenient 
for them. For example, Robert Jackson, an Assistant Attorney General in the Justice 
Department under President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937, said, “Precedents are the 
most powerful influence in aiding and supporting reactionary conclusions. The judge who 
can take refuge in precedent does not need to reason.”33 Jackson, however, reversed his 
opinion on precedent when he was made Supreme Court Justice by President Roosevelt 
in 1941. In 1944, Justice Jackson said that, “I cannot believe…that any person who at all 
values the judicial process or distinguishes its method and philosophy from those of the 
political and legislative process would…substantially impair the rule of stare decisis.”34 
Justice Jackson’s change of heart indicates a reverence for stare decisis, only when 
personally advantageous. As an Assistant Attorney General, he spoke against precedent 
because it impeded his ability to make change through the Department of Justice. 
However, as Supreme Court Justice, Jackson revered precedent.  
Justice Jackson’s approach to precedent once made Supreme Court Justice does not 
indicate the sentiment of all Justices, or even liberal Justices. In fact, Justice Hugo Black, 
one of the Supreme Court’s most famous liberal Justices, was staunchly opposed to 
precedent. He “largely rejected precedent as a legitimate source of constitutional decision 
making.”35 Unlike many moderate stare decisis supporters, Justice Black did not believe 
in prudence for precedent. He not only believed that erroneous decisions be overturned, 
 
32 Ibid, 402. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid, 403. 
35 Gerhardt, “A Tale of Two Textualists,” 32. 
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but also that “any precedent that conflicts with [his approach] to constitutional 
interpretation” be reversed.36  
  
 
36 Ibid, 32-33. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
 
To understand the Supreme Court’s application of stare decisis and the reasons it 
views acceptable to depart from the doctrine, I read every case from the first year of the 
Supreme Court to the recent Roberts Court that explicitly overturned a prior Supreme 
Court decision. The Congressional Research Service compiled a list of every Supreme 
Court decision that has been overruled by a subsequent decision from the first case in 
1810 through 2016.  To complete the study, I conducted my own research to find cases 
from 2016 to 2018 that overturned a prior decision. In total, I read 187 cases that 
explicitly overturned 242 prior Supreme Court decisions.  
In order to analyze trends over time, I grouped the cases by Supreme Court Chief 
Justice: The Marshall-Vinson Courts represents the cases from 1801 through 1953; The 
Warren Court represents the cases from 1953 through 1969; The Burger Court represents 
the cases from 1969 through 1986; the Rehnquist Court represents the cases from 1986 
through 2005; and the Roberts Court represents the cases from 2005 through 2018. I 
grouped the cases between 1810 and 1952 into one chapter because it contained roughly 
the same number of cases as later iterations of the Supreme Court, and I wanted to focus 
on the modern conceptions of stare decisis. However, I did not want to exclude the first 
164 years of the Supreme Court because I found these traditional understandings of stare 
decisis to be a useful comparison in order to gauge the changes over time of this doctrine. 
Each subsequent Court was grouped by Supreme Court Justice. While I understand that 
 22 
this may not be the most precise way to conceptualize the opinions of stare decisis within 
the Court, I found that it generally encapsulated the views of the era. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Marshall – Vinson Courts (1810-1953) 
 
From 1789 to 1953, there were only 58 cases in the Supreme Court that 
overturned a previous Supreme Court decision. Despite the existing philosophy and 
theoretical exaltation of stare decisis, many of majority opinions during this time did not 
discuss the process or reasoning for overturning previous decisions. Of the 58 cases that 
overturned a prior Supreme Court decision during this 164-year time period, fewer than 
15 cases provided more than one sentence on the rationale for overturning precedent. For 
example, many cases simply state that the previous decision is not consistent with their 
current decision, and should thus be overruled.37 However, in this chapter, I will discuss 
the few cases that did mention the considerations for upholding or abandoning stare 
decisis. It is important to note that these categories of justification are not mutually 
exclusive; the Court often provides several rationales, frequently relying on the general 
inaccuracy of the prior decision.  
 
Abandoning Erroneous Decisions 
 Despite the long history of stare decisis as a legal doctrine, the first 164 years of 
the Court rarely discussed the rationale for overturning precedent. The most commonly 
cited reason for overturning a previous decision during this time was that the precedent 
was erroneous. Most of the cases during this time period briefly say that the governing 
 
37 Examples include Union Pac. R. Co. v. McShane, 89 U.S. 444; Leisy v. Hardin, 12 Ky.L.Rptr. 167; 
Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U.S. 529; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
268 U.S. 203; East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465; 
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precedent is in conflict with the decision of the current court and should no longer be 
considered binding. These cases imply the prior precedent’s erroneous nature. However, 
there are a few cases that expand this explanation by delving into the prior decision and 
why the Court considers it to be mistaken. In 1941, through Nye v. U.S., the Court 
overturned the 1918 decision in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S. based on its erroneous 
nature. In Nye v. U.S., the petitioners were found guilty of contempt under section 268 of 
the Judicial Code for attempting to dismiss a wrongful death suit through undue 
influence. However, Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S. previously held that a congressional 
act passed, which further detailed the court’s power to hold a person in contempt, did not 
limit or expand the court’s power to hold a person in contempt, but was purely intended 
to clarify the rights of the judiciary. That is to say Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S. 
determined that the Court is not limited in holding a person in criminal contempt. In Nye 
v. U.S., the Court held that Congress did, in fact, limit the powers of the judiciary; and 
thus, it could not hold a person in criminal contempt unless the individual was physically 
near the courthouse itself. In his majority opinion, Justice Douglas wrote, “the legislative 
history of this statute and its career demonstrate that this case presents the question of 
correcting a plain misreading of language and history so as to give full respect to the 
meaning which Congress unmistakably intended for the statute to have.”38 Based on a 
thorough examination of the statute and case history, the Stone Court determined that 
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S. was wrongly decided.  
The Court similarly overruled Crain v. United States in Garland v. State of 
Washington in 1914. The Court closely analyzed the prior ruling’s reasoning, but 
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ultimately found its interpretation and holding incorrect. In 1896, the Court held that, in 
criminal cases, entering a formal plea was an entitlement provided for by the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court later unanimously held that the 
Due Process clause does not require the states to adopt the same criminal procedures in 
order to protect citizens’ privileges and immunities; thus, the Court overturned the initial 
decision in Crain. Unlike Nye v. U.S., however, Justice Day mentioned his disinclination 
to abandon stare decisis in his majority opinion in Garland. He said: 
Holding this view, notwithstanding our reluctance to overrule former decisions of 
this court, we now are constrained to hold that the technical enforcement of formal 
rights in criminal procedure sustained in the Crain Case is no longer required in the 
prosecution of offenses under present systems of law, and so far as that case is not 
in accord with the views herein expressed, it is necessarily overruled.39  
 
This opinion breaks the judicial norm for the era by paying lip service to the importance 
of stare decisis. This decision instituted the Court’s tendency to justify its abandonment 
of precedent. Now, it would be unthinkable for the Court to overturn precedent without 
any explanation.  
According to Amy Coney Barrett, a United States Appellate Judge in the Seventh 
Circuit, the Court’s use of an erroneous decision as justification for abandoning stare 
decisis can be difficult to argue. She wrote, “an erroneous precedent is one that reflects 
the ‘wrong’ constitutional philosophy: a judge espousing an approach of active liberty 
may judge an originalist precedent mistaken, not because it incorrectly determined the 
relevant provision’s public meaning, but because it treated that meaning as dispositive.”40 
Individual Supreme Court Justices often use competing methodologies for evaluating 
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constitutional meaning, which informs their opinion of a precedent correctness. Since the 
Vinson Court ended in 1953, the Supreme Court has drastically decreased the number of 
cases that use erroneous decisions as the sole justification for overturning a precedent. 
Abandoning stare decisis due to the Justice’s personal belief in its misinterpretation of 
the law perpetuates the belief that the Supreme Court acts on the nine Justices personal 
opinion as opposed to professional jurisprudence.  
Judge Barrett’s association between the abandonment of stare decisis and the drive of 
the Justice’s personal opinion is illustrated in Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Smith 
v. Allwright in 1944. He wrote: 
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose 
greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, which has been 
looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would 
hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinions, should 
now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as 
to the stability of our institutions.41 
 
Justice Roberts attributed the overturning of Grovey v. Townsend to the majority’s 
personal opinions and the public’s temporary feelings. Furthermore, Justice Roberts is the 
first to voice concerns of the Court’s legitimacy when overturning precedent; this concern 
with stare decisis and has since become pervasive in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
 
Obeying the Intention 
When the Court faces the predicament of choosing one precedent over another, the 
Court often favors the prior decisions’ purpose instead of its decrees. For example, in 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish chose to uphold cases such as Radice v. New York and 
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Nebbia v. New York and O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company over 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C. because its principles reflected the original purpose 
of the statute. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Hughes said, “We think that the 
views expressed are sound and that the decision in the Adkins Case was a departure from 
the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the state of the relation 
of employer and employed. Those principles have been reinforced by our subsequent 
decisions.”42 Chief Justice Hughes cited Radice v. New York, O’Gorman & Young v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, and Nebbia v. New York, which were decided in 
1924, 1931, and 1934 respectively, all after the 1923 case of Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital of D.C. Because those cases did not directly relate to women’s minimum wages, 
the Court was able to distinguish them from the Adkins case. However, when West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish came to the Court with virtually similar facts, the Court had to 
choose between the rule dictated by Adkins or the general principles affirmed in the more 
recent precedents. The Court decided to rule in favor of the more recent precedents and 
officially overrule Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C. in order to pursue the principles 
of protecting a class of workers with unequal bargaining power.  
Three years later, in 1940, the Court faced a similar obstacle of deciding between the 
rule and the principle in Helvering v. Hallock. Two previous decisions dictated that a 
grantee’s income through property held in trust could not be taxed by an estate transfer 
tax after the grantor’s death. In Helvering, however, the Court ruled the opposite due to 
the prior Court’s plain misunderstanding of the Revenue Act of 1918. In this case, the 
Justice Frankfurter wrote in his majority decision that: 
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The real problem is whether a principle shall prevail over its later misapplications. 
Surely we are not bound by reason or by the considerations that underlie stare 
decisis to persevere in distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on 
further examination, appear consonant neither with the purposes of the statute nor 
with this Court’s own conception of it.43 
 
Although the Court recognized the importance of stare decisis as a social policy, they 
prioritized the maintenance of the principle set out in Congress’ statute over the Court’s 
wrongful practice of it.  
 
Obeying Federalism 
Another significant theme seen throughout the Supreme Court’s first 164 years is the 
Court’s acquiescence to decisions made at the state level. The Supreme Court often 
defers its decision to the decisions of the state judiciary. For example, in Green v. Neal’s 
Lessee, the Supreme Court examined the statute of limitations for a peaceable possessor 
of land with no legal claim by suit in Tennessee. Although two previous Supreme Court 
cases44 determined that the statute of limitations is only applied to those who possess the 
land under a grant or deed, the Supreme Court overruled those decisions in favor of the 
settled law in Tennessee. The majority opinion in the Marshall Court wrote, “it is now 
made to appear that these decisions were made under such circumstances, that they were 
never considered in the state of Tennessee as fully settling the construction of the act.”45 
The Court abandoned its own federal precedent in favor of Tennessee’s state precedent 
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made in 1828, which settled the question within the state more so than the federal cases 
seemed to. 
This theme is seen again in 1877 in Cass County v. Johnston. This case overturned 
Harshman v. Bates, which determined Missouri’s Township Aid Act to be 
unconstitutional under the Missouri Constitution in 1875. In Chief Justice Waite’s 
majority opinion, he references nine cases that appeared in the Missouri Supreme Court, 
each of which upheld the Township Aid Act of Missouri. Chief Justice Waite said: 
These decisions had all been made, and had never been questioned, when the act 
of 1868, now under consideration, was passed. They were also in force, as 
evidence of the law of the State, when the bonds in controversy were issued; and 
so far as we are advised, there has been no disposition since on the part of the 
courts of the State to modify them.46 
Chief Justice Waite deferred to the decision of a state court over that of the federal court. 
He even stated that the state court’s decision “is binding upon us.”47 Early conceptions of 
federalism consider state governments to be the primary arbiters of governmental 
responsibilities, and that federal interference requires special justification.48 The 
nineteenth century iterations of the Supreme Court manifest the federal government’s 
general deference to state governments.  
 
Abandoning Nonaccepted Decisions 
During this period, the Supreme Court generally overruled precedents that are eroded 
by subsequent decisions. According to Professor Randy J. Kozel of Notre Dame Law 
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School, these eroded decisions are seen, by the Court, as “anachronism[s] that should be 
overturned.”49 In 1798, the Supreme Court determined that the Court’s jurisdiction over a 
case depends on the sum in dispute before the initial decision.50 In Gordon v. Ogden in 
1830, Chief Justice Marshall overturned Wilson v. Daniel, and he decided that the Court’s 
jurisdiction over a case depends on the sum in dispute when the writ of error is filed. In 
his decision, Chief Justice Marshall said: 
Although that case was decided by a divided court, and although we think that 
upon the true construction of the twenty-second section of the judicial act, the 
jurisdiction of the court depends upon the sum in dispute between the parties as 
the case stands upon the writ of error, we should be much include to adhere to the 
decision in Wilson vs. Daniel, had not a contrary practice since prevailed.51 
 
Even though the Court believed the decision to be wrong, they would have felt compelled 
to follow the prior decision. However, because the decision upheld in Wilson v. Daniel 
was no longer the prevailing practice of the judiciary, the Court felt compelled to follow a 
more recent precedent set by the Court in 1809 by Cooke v. Woodrow. The Court 
abandoned its eleven-year-old precedent because it indirectly overturned in Cooke. The 
Court’s quick rejection of the doctrine set out in Wilson not only indicates its weakness as 
a decision, but also its inability to bind to the fabric of society.  
Later, in 1867, the Supreme Court overturned Sheehy v. Mandeville & Jamesson 
through its decision in Mason v. Eldred due to its inefficacy as a precedent. In the 
majority decision, Justice Field noted the refusal of state courts to follow the decision in 
Sheehy. He explained that: 
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[T]he Supreme Court of Illinois commented upon the case of Sheehy v. 
Mandeville, and declined to follow it as authority. The court observed that 
notwithstanding the respect which it felt for the opinions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, it was well satisfied that the rule adopted by the several state 
courts—referring to those of New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Indiana—
was more consistent with the principles of law, and was supported by better 
reasons.52 
 
Although horizontal precedent is often assumed and unquestioned, the decisions made by 
the Supreme Court are not always believed correct to the states’ conception of the law. 
The widespread refusal or hesitation of states to follow Supreme Court precedent, despite 
their reverence for opinions from the highest court, indicates to the Court a potential error 
in judgment on their part. Not only does this decision reinforce the Supreme Court’s 
deference to state courts during this era, but it reinforces the idea that the Court’s 
susceptibility to public opinion, especially to that of legal scholars and lower courts.53  
Not only does the state courts’ refusal to uphold Supreme Court precedent indicate 
that the Court may have been mistaken when deciding the prior judgment, but it also 
prevents the very things stare decisis was intended to protect: uniformity and certainty. 
Justice Brandeis made this clear in his majority decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins in 
1938. He said, “[p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of 
common law prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory 
line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law developed 
a new well of uncertainties.”54 The prior law affirmed in Swift v. Tyson in 1842 expanded 
the powers of the federal judiciary by allowing federal courts to not “apply the unwritten 
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law of the state as declared by its highest court.”55 The Court disavowed Swift ’s 
conception of an expanded federal judiciary because “in applying the doctrine this Court 
and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the 
Constitution to the several states.”56 Although the Court determined Swift to be 
erroneous, they further justified their decision to overturn Swift by demonstrating state 
courts’ disapproval and noncompliance to the Supreme Court precedent. The uniformity 
of laws and clarity of its application is the purpose of stare decisis; thus, a precedent that 
not only prevents but causes the absence of those principles is not a precedent worth 
upholding in the name of the thing it defeats. 
 
Abandoning Decisions That Have Unforeseen Consequences  
An uncommon, but nonetheless mentioned, consideration for overturning precedent 
in this era was unintended consequences often causing social detriment. This concern was 
mentioned in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins when overturning Swift v. Tyson ’s expansion of 
the federal judiciary. In his majority decision, Justice Brandeis said, “Experience in 
applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects, political and social; and 
the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue.”57 The reality of the decision 
defied the Court’s expectation for the outcome of the decision. In this sense, a negative 
impact on society or unintended consequences cannot be prevented entirely by an initial 
Supreme Court decision. Only society’s experience of applying the law and seeing its 
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negative effects can inform the Court’s reconsideration of the initial decision. Thus, it can 
only be undone by the initial decision’s later overruling.  
This justification was used earlier by Chief Justice Taney in The Genessee Chief in 
1851. In this case, the Court overruled The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson in the Genesee 
Chief v. Fitzhugh. In The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, the Court limited federal 
jurisdiction to merely tidal waterways, while The Genessee Chief expanded federal 
jurisdiction to include interior waterways and bodies of freshwater.58 Although Chief 
Justice Taney said that “stare decisis is the safe and established rule of judicial policy, 
and should always be adhered to,”59 he found it imperative to overturn The Steamboat 
Thomas Jefferson on the foundation that it could create severe societal damage. In his 
majority opinion, he wrote that the “former decision was founded in error, and that the 
error, if not corrected, must produce serious public as well as private inconvenience and 
loss, it becomes our duty not to perpetuate it.”60 The potential impact of such an 
egregiously erroneous decision motivated the Court to overturn it despite its recognition 
of the general importance of stare decisis.  
 
Obeying Congressional Power 
The Court emphasizes Congress’ ability to change their decision through legislation, 
while also distinguishing between the Court’s strengthened ability to overturn precedent 
in constitutional cases because of Congress’ inability to change constitutional 
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interpretation. In Green v. Neal’s Lessee, the Court said, “[i]t is emphatically the law of 
the state; which the federal court, while sitting within the state, and this court, when a 
case is brought before them, are called to enforce. If the rule as settled should prove 
inconvenient or injurious to the public interests, the legislature of the state may modify 
the law or repeal it.”61 In other words, the Court shifts the responsibility of their decision 
to Congress by stating their ability to change the interpretation of the law with clearer 
legislation. With this opinion, the Court opposes prior justifications set forward by the 
Court for overturning precedent, namely, unforeseen consequences. This opinion 
suggests that the responsibility is in the hands of Congress to respond to the unforeseen 
consequences of their decisions. Whereas the decision in Erie, decided only six years 
before, indicated that the Court was responsible for overturning decisions with harmful 
effects on society. Furthermore, the Court stated that their decisions are not the be-all-
end-all of legal interpretation, thus lowering the stakes of their decision to overturn 
precedent. This consideration dismantles the public’s perception of the Court as final 
arbitrators of the law. This concept was reiterated nineteen years later in Chief Justice 
Taney’s majority opinion in The Genessee Chief. He said, “[f]or if the law, as 
pronounced by the court, ought not to stand, it is in the power of the legislature to amend 
it without impairing rights acquired under it.”62 While Congress’ ability to change the law 
as a reaction to social detriment experienced by the decision or their pure disagreement 
with the decision, this is only true in statutory cases. 
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In the 1944 case Smith v. Allwright, Justice Reed distinguished between the Court’s 
levels of scrutiny of stare decisis in constitutional versus congressional statutory cases. In 
his majority opinion, he said: 
In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not 
upon legislative action this Court throughout history has freely exercised it power 
to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has long been accepted 
practice, and this practice has continued to this day. This is particularly true when 
the decision believed erroneous is the application of a constitutional principle 
rather than an interpretation of the Constitution to extract the principle itself.63 
 
Changing the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution would necessarily require 
Congress to pass a constitutional amendment. According to the Pew Research Center, 
there have been 12,000 proposed constitutional amendments, of which only 33 have gone 
to the states for ratification, and only 27 have passed.64 Thus, constitutional amendments 
have a 0.225% pass rate. Amendments to the Constitution are so rare that only four 
Supreme Court decisions have been undone by constitutional amendment.65 Because of 
this difficulty, it is generally more acceptable to overturn precedent when it relates to a 
constitutional provision as opposed to a congressional provision, which can be undone by 
a simple majority in Congress.  
 However, this was not always the case. Only six years before Justice Reed’s opinion 
in Smith v. Allwright, he concurred in the decision for Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. In his 
concurring opinion he said, “In this Court, stare decisis, in statutory construction, is a 
useful rule, not an inexorable command…it seems preferable to overturn an established 
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construction of an act of Congress, rather than, in the circumstances of this case, to 
interpret the Constitution.”66 Justice Reed clearly changed his opinion of the Court’s role 
in overturning constitutional provisions. In this decision, he stated his preference for 
overturning congressional statutes over interpreting constitutional ones; however, six 
years later he explained his preference for overturning constitutional provisions due to its 
difficulty for change through Congress. Justice Reed’s change of heart represents the 
conflicting views of legal scholars when it comes to the Supreme Court’s reliance on 
precedent in constitutional cases. The doctrine of stare decisis often has a positive 
connotation because it evokes thoughts of certainty, reliance, equality, efficiency, and 
judicial restraint.67 Thus, overturning precedent, and specifically much relied upon 
constitutional precedent, often awakens fear of the strength and power vested in the 
Supreme Court.  
 
Obeying Stability 
Many of the cases’ dissents elucidate the Court’s jurisprudence with respect to stare 
decisis. In Helvering v. Hallock in 1940, Justice Roberts’ dissent, joined by Justice 
McReynolds, spoke in depth about the importance of stare decisis to creating uniformity 
and stability in the law. He said: 
If there ever was an instance in which the doctrine of stare decisis should govern, 
this is it. Aside from the obvious hardship involved in treating the taxpayers in the 
present cases different from many others whose cases have been decided or closed 
in accordance with the settled rule, there are the weightier considerations that the 
judgments now rendered disappoint the just expectations of those who have acted 
in reliance upon the uniform construction of the statute by this and all other 
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federal tribunals; and that, to upset these precedents now, must necessarily shake 
the confidence of the bar and the public in the stability of the rulings of the courts 
and make it impossible for inferior tribunals to adjudicate controversies in 
reliance on the decisions of this court. To nullify more than fifty decisions, five of 
them which have stood for a decade, in order to change a mere rule of statutory 
construction, seems to me an altogether unwise and unjustified exertion of 
power.68 
 
Justice Roberts’ argument against the overruling of precedent in this case rests upon the 
themes of reliance, stability, and passivity. By inverting decisions that have been relied 
upon for a decade, the Court creates uncertainty and instability throughout the public on 
their rights. Justice Roberts also pointed to a theme that is pervasive throughout the 
discussion of stare decisis: power. Many scholars argue that the Court’s abandonment of 
stare decisis in certain cases is evidence of the Court’s expansion of power and activism. 
In an essay on the relationship between stare decisis and judicial restraint, former 
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. said, “[t]he inevitability of change touches the 
law as it does every aspect of life. But stability and moderation are uniquely important in 
the law. In the long run, restraint in decision-making and respect for decisions once made 
are the keys to the preservation of an independent judiciary and public respect for the 
judiciary’s role as guardian of rights.”69 The Court clearly feels required to balance the 
necessity for correctly interpreted law and stability within the law. 
 Similarly, Justice Roberts argued against the overturning of Grovey v. Townsend in 
his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Allwright. Smith v. Allwright determined that denying 
blacks the right to vote in the primary violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision 
abandoned a unanimous precedent set nine years prior that the Democratic Party’s 
 
68 Helvering, 309 U.S. at 129. 
69 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint,” Washington & Lee Law Review 47, no. 2 
(Spring 1990): 289-290. 
 38 
exclusion of blacks in the primary was free from the protections in the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts said: 
The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced 
about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same 
class as a railroad ticket, good for this day and train only, I have no assurance, in 
view of current decisions that the opinion announced today may not shortly be 
repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they have new light on the 
subject.70 
 
Although many of the arguments in favor of abiding my stare decisis tend to be 
philosophical, Justice Roberts discussed the pragmatic implications of overturning 
precedent. He expressed his concerns for the legitimacy of the Court and the stability of 
their current decisions. It is fitting that Justice Roberts voiced this concern in this case as 
he wrote the opinion for the unanimous decision in Grovey v. Townsend. Justice Roberts’ 
argument illustrates Professor Michael Gerhardt’s theory that respecting precedent makes 
the current decisions seem more lasting. In his book he wrote, “If a Justice disregards the 
judgments of those who preceded him, he invites the very same treatment from those who 
succeed him. A justice who wants to preserve the value of his own coin must not devalue 
the coin of his predecessors.”71  
 
Conclusion 
Although many recent legal philosophies indicate that an erroneous decision is not 
enough to justify the overturning of longstanding precedent, the early years of the 
Supreme Court indicate otherwise. Michael Kimberly, the co-director of Yale Law 
School’s Supreme Court Clinic, said, “Concluding that a prior decision may be wrong — 
 
70 Smith, 321 U.S. at 669. 
71 Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent, 18. 
 39 
even one that interprets the Constitution — is not enough to justify overruling it.”72 
However, the early decisions of the Supreme Court demonstrate that that was not always 
the case. In fact, the majority of cases that overturned Supreme Court precedent merely 
cited that the prior decision was incorrect, and should no longer be considered good law. 
Some early decisions, such as Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, strengthen their argument to 
abandon stare decisis with arguments of public rejection of the decision or an unforeseen 
social detriment; however, these arguments were always founded on the prior decision’s 
erroneous nature.  
Despite the lack of stringent standards for overturning precedent between 1789 and 
1953, the Supreme Court only averaged a 0.35 overturned cases per year. While the 
Court did not have many precedents to overturn, the Court clearly maintained respect for 
stare decisis. Even Chief Justice Vinson, who served for seven years between 1946 and 
1953, averaged fewer than one overturned case per year. During this time period, only 
two Chief Justices had overturned more than one case per year. The first 164 years of the 
Court’s existence was marked by the tension between caution and correction, where 
caution tended to win out. 
  
 
72 Michael Kimberly, “Symposium: The Importance of Respecting Precedent,” SCOTUSBlog, 20 December 
2017, https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/symposium-importance-respecting-precedent/. 
 40 
CHAPTER 5 
The Warren Court (1953-1969) 
 
Although the Warren Court immediately followed the Vinson Court in 1953, its 
reasons for overturning precedent are very different. The Court during Warren’s sixteen 
years as Chief Justice faced very different questions than previous courts such as the 
incorporation doctrine and union rights. The incorporation doctrine plays a particularly 
large role during this time because it required the Court to determine whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause disallowed states from passing laws that 
violated the first Ten Amendments of the Constitution.73 This constitutional doctrine 
emerged in the early twentieth century and made extreme headway in the middle of the 
century.74 When faced with a case involving the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme 
Court had to determine whether the amendment would be fully, partially or not 
incorporated. To do so, the Court had to overturn nineteenth century precedent expressly 
disaffirming the principles of the incorporation doctrine. While the incorporation doctrine 
is a significant theme throughout this time period and can account for a large portion of 
the overturning cases, the Court put forward many reasons for overturning precedent 
including tradition, eroded decisions, policy and public opinion. 
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Obeying Tradition 
A frequently cited reason during this time period was that the overturned case had in 
fact broke away from prior constitutional precedent, tradition or principles. For example, 
in Reid v. Covert in 1957, the Court overturned a one-year old precedent set in Ross v. 
McIntyre that held that American citizens abroad could be tried by military authorities. In 
his majority opinion, Justice Black defended Mrs. Covert’s right to a trial by a jury of her 
peers. He said, “We should not break with this nation’s tradition of keeping military 
power subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which we believe is firmly embodied 
in the Constitution.”75 Although this principle is not expressly written in the Constitution, 
the majority of the Court at the time believed that this tradition should be affirmed 
nonetheless. To legal scholars, this case affirms the formidable weight of the American 
constitutional right to trial by jury established in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the 
Constitution.76 However, to Brittany Warren, a United States Army captain in the JAG 
Corps, this case upholds the U.S. judiciary’s tradition of skepticism of independent 
military jurisdiction.77  
Furthermore, in James v. United States, in 1961, the Court determined that illegally 
obtained income, such as extorted money, could be taxed. The majority decision 
expressly overruled Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilcox, a fifteen-year-old 
precedent. In justifying this decision to overrule an older, and thus relied upon, precedent, 
Chief Justice Warren wrote, “It had been a well-established principle, long before either 
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Rutkin or Wilcox, that unlawful, as well as lawful, gains are comprehended within the 
term ‘gross income.’”78 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren used several 
Supreme Court decisions to indicate the “well-established” nature of this principle. While 
Chief Justice Warren argued that his decision endorsed a more traditional view of tax 
law, he also pointed to a change in Section II B of the Income Tax Act of 1913 made in 
1916 that omitted the word “lawful” from its inclusion of income. Thus, according to 
Chief Justice Warren, his conception of tax law was well-supported by historic and more 
recent developments.  
Similarly, in 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright overruled Betts v. Brady, which determined 
that the right to a lawyer only extended to federal criminal cases, not state criminal cases. 
The Court in Gideon, however, relied on the incorporation doctrine to extend this Sixth 
Amendment right to states. In his majority decision, Justice Black stated: 
The fact is that in deciding as it did—that ‘appointment of counsel is not a 
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial’—the Court in Betts v. Brady made an 
abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents. In returning to these old 
precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional 
principles established to achieve a fair system of justice.79  
 
The Court defended its overturning of precedent on the basis that the precedent 
abandoned its prior precedent. Despite overturning a twenty-one-year old precedent, the 
Court maintains the importance of precedent by relying on precedent and constitutional 
principles for its decision. Many legal scholars and Justices have voiced their concern 
that overruling precedent delegitimizes the Supreme Court as an influential institution.80 
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Thus, referring to prior precedent as justification for overturning a long-established 
decision lends legitimacy to the decision, and the Supreme Court generally. 
The Court in Peyton v. Rowe similarly overruled McNally v. Hill on the basis that it 
contradicted constitutional principles and tradition. In this case, the Supreme Court 
unanimously decided that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences can petition for writs 
of habeas corpus for a future service. According to Chief Justice Warren, the Court “need 
not look very far to discover three principal characteristics of the writ as it had developed 
in the federal courts even before the decision in McNally.”81 The Court analyzed the 
history and founding of the United States to determine the purpose of the writ of habeas 
corpus. The Court determined that the purpose of habeas corpus was the “protection of 
individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their 
liberty.”82 Because McNally undermined this significant constitutional principle and 
tradition of liberty, the Court unanimously overruled it as good law. 
Although the Court overturned precedent in Peyton v. Rowe, it nonetheless clarified 
the usefulness of stare decisis. In order to legitimize their abandonment of McNally, the 
Court said, “[n]o prior decision of the Court was cited as clear authority for the 
prematurity doctrine.”83 The decision in McNally lacked reliance on Supreme Court 
precedent; thus, the Court viewed it as having weakened legitimacy. This attempt to 
garner legitimacy by the Warren Court reinforces the legal theory of a correlation 
between upholding prior decisions and the Court’s legitimacy. 
 
 
81 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 59 (1968). 
82 Id., 66. 
83 Id., 65. 
 44 
Abandoning Eroded Decisions 
Another very common reason for overturning precedent during this time period is that 
the precedent had been undermined by subsequent decisions, and thus, its standing as 
precedent had been eroded. Just as arguing the case’s breach from prior Supreme Court 
cases lent the Court legitimacy, the Court similarly relied on precedent decided after the 
precedent in question. The Court carefully uses some form of judicial precedent to 
ground its later decisions.84 For example, in Smith v. Evening News Association, the 
Court overruled a fifteen-year-old precedent in favor of prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of union membership. In his majority opinion for eight members of the Court, 
Justice White stated, “However, subsequent decisions here have removed the 
underpinnings of Westinghouse and its holding is no longer authoritative as a 
precedent.”85 Although subsequent cases did not expressly overrule Westinghouse 
Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., the basis on which this decision rested was no longer 
applicable. In Westinghouse, the Court ruled that section 301 did not give federal courts 
the jurisdiction to rule on contracts between the employer and employee. However, four 
later federal courts used section 301 to resolve suits between employers and employees’ 
collective bargaining contracts about wages, hours, wrongful discharge, back pay, and 
no-strike clauses. While these cases were not specifically about discrimination on the 
basis of union membership, they clearly undermined the argument that this section did 
not give the federal courts the ability to rule on collective bargaining agreements. 
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Similarly, in Jackson v. Denno in 1964, the Court overruled Stein v. New York, which 
allowed a jury may hear a potentially coerced confession as evidence. In his majority 
decision, Justice White said: 
This underpinning of Stein proved to be a short-lived departure from prior views 
of the Court, and was unequivocally put to rest in Rogers v. Richmond, where it 
was held that the reliability of a confession has nothing to do with its 
voluntariness—proof that a defendant committed the act with which he is charged 
and to which he has confessed is not to be considered when deciding whether a 
defendant’s will has been overborne.86 
 
Justice White relied on a more recent precedent, Rogers v. Richmond, which held that the 
admissibility of confessions had to comply with the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Thus, the 1953 decision in Stein v. New York was weakened after Rogers v. 
Richmond was decided in 1961, and the Court could not consider it to be binding 
precedent.  
The Court overruled a forty-nine-year-old precedent for similar reasons in Spevack v. 
Klein. In this case, the Court extended Fifth Amendment protections to lawyers refusing 
to testify on the basis that it might incriminate them. The Court relied on Malloy v. 
Hogan to show how far Fifth Amendment protections have come. In his majority 
opinion, Justice Douglas stated, “While Cohen v. Hurley was not overruled [in Malloy v. 
Hogan], the majority indicated that the principle on which it rested had been seriously 
eroded.”87 Although the Court affirmed precedent in Malloy v. Hogan, the Court 
decisions set forth very different principles. Thus, through this case, the Court weakened 
and eventually invalidated the principles and ruling in Cohen v. Hurley. Differing 
principles must eventually be reconciled through overruling one case over the other. 
 
86 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384-85 (1964). 
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The Court’s reliance on a recent precedent that overturned a prior case in order to 
overrule another indicates the Court’s susceptibility to changing legal interpretation in 
response to social change. When a case overturns a prior decision, it leaves similar 
decisions vulnerable for revocation.  The Supreme Court’s persistent argument that a 
preceding decision has been eroded by subsequent decisions supports the political science 
theory that precedents depreciate rather quickly.88 Significant legal research demonstrates 
a close relationship between weakened precedent and changing societal conditions.89  
Similarly, in Katz v. United States, the Court decided that the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extended to phone calls. Through 
this decision, the Court overturned Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. United 
States. In his majority decision, Justice Stewart cited several cases that expanded Fourth 
Amendment protections from the narrow view set out in the two precedents in questions. 
To further justify the Court’s decision to overturn over twenty-year-old precedents, 
Justice Stewart said, “We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman 
have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there 
enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”90 In this reasoning, Justice Stewart 
used passive voice to exonerate the Court from any responsibility for overturning 
precedent. He indicated that the overturning of precedent was inevitable due to 
subsequent decisions erosion of that precedent. By doing so, Justice Stewart places more 
significance to more recent precedent than older precedent. The Court’s affinity for more 
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recent precedent may indicate the importance of societal change in overturning precedent. 
More recent precedent reflects a revision in Constitutional interpretation caused by 
societal change. 
The Court in Peyton v. Rowe reflected a similar proclivity for more recent precedent 
as opposed to older ones. In addition to stating that its precedent, McNally v. Hill, did not 
accurately reflect the constitutional purpose of habeas corpus, the Court wrote that they 
chose to follow more recent precedent. In his unanimous, majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Warren cited an appellate decision in his justification. He wrote: 
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge Haynsworth reasoned that this Court 
would no longer follow McNally, which in his view represented a ‘doctrinaire 
approach’ based on an ‘old jurisdictional concept’ which had been ‘thoroughly 
rejected by the Supreme Court in recent cases.’ We are in complete agreement 
with this conclusion and the considerations underlying it.91 
 
The Court validated the Court of Appeal’s decision to abandon Supreme Court precedent 
because its archaic and uncompromising principles had been undermined by later 
Supreme Court decisions. The eroded concepts of this precedent made the decision 
unable to stand. Similar to Justice Stewart in Katz v. United States, Chief Justice Warren 
approached overturning longstanding precedent with passivity. He used a lower court’s 
judge’s decision and the uncontrollable erosion of McNally to justify overturning 
Supreme Court precedent. This further advances the Court’s hesitance to take 
responsibility for the erosion and overruling of precedent. 
 
 
91 Peyton, 391 U.S. at 57. 
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Abandoning Poor Policy 
The most controversial reason perpetuated by the Warren Court for overturning 
precedent is the Court’s disagreement with the government’s policies. In James v. United 
States, the Court  not only believed that Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilcox 
broke valid constitutional principles, but they also believed the inability to tax illegally 
obtained income as poor policy. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren wrote: 
We believed that Wilcox was wrongly decided and we find nothing in 
congressional history since then to persuade us that Congress intended to legislate 
the rule. Thus, we believe that we should now correct the error and the confusion 
resulting from it, certainly if we do so in a manner that will not prejudice those 
who might have relied on it.92 
 
In addition to believing Wilcox was decided erroneously, the Court argues that its poor 
policy, which Congress will not change, warrants the Court  overrule. This logic strongly 
departs from previous Courts, which have deliberately decided to not overturn precedents 
where Congress clearly did not intend to change the policy or the law.93  
The Supreme Court during this period took policy into consideration on many levels. 
Not only did the Court overturn cases which perpetuated bad policy, but they also looked 
into a policy’s history when determining whether a precedent should be overturned. For 
example, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, the Court 
unanimously overruled five precedents in favor of incorporating the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination to the states. Despite the five, now overruled, precedents, 
the Court said, “We reject—as unsupported by history or policy—the deviation from that 
construction only recently adopted by this Court in United States v. Murdock, and 
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Feldman v. United States.”94 The Court used the lack of policy enacted by Congress or 
the executive to support United States v. Murdock and Feldman v. United States’ non-
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment to the states as a reason to overturn them.  
Although the Warren Court often referenced policy as a consideration for overturning 
precedent, this novel reasoning was not supported by all members of the Court. In Harper 
v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court overruled Breedlove v. Suttles, which 
allowed states to have poll taxes. In his dissent, Justice Black argued against what he 
perceived as judicial activism on the Court.  He said, “The court, however, overrules 
Breedlove in part, but its opinion reveals that is does so not by using its limited power to 
interpret the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, but by giving that clause a 
new meaning which it believes represents a better governmental policy.”95  Their belief 
that overturning Breedlove v. Suttles represented better policy perpetuated their own 
personal ideology, and thus, motivated the Court’s overturning of precedent.  
In addition to the many unprecedented reasons the Court gave for abandoning stare 
decisis, the Court during this time period presented familiar justifications for overturning 
precedent. Many cases during this period revive the argument from previous Courts that 
the maintenance of certain precedents lead to uncertainty or confusion. For example, in 
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that state courts cannot admit evidence seized without 
complying with the Fourth Amendment. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black stated : 
Only one thing emerged with complete clarity from the Irvine case—that is that 
seven Justices rejected the ‘shock-the-conscience’ constitutional standard 
enunciated in Wolf and Rochin cases. But even this did not lessen the confusion 
in this area of the law because the continued existence of mutually inconsistent 
precedents together with the Court’s inability to settle upon a majority opinion in 
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the Irvine case left the situation at least as uncertain as it had been before. Finally, 
today, we clear up that uncertainty.96 
 
In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to states, but that the exclusionary rule 
disallowing this evidence from court was not a constitutional protection. In Irvine v. 
California, the Court relied on Wolf v. Colorado to determine that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable 
search and seizure.”97 However, Irvine did abandon the standard created in Wolf, thus, 
creating an uncertain standard and rule to follow in Fourth Amendment cases. By 
overturning Wolf v. Colorado in part, and Irvine v. California in part, the Court viewed 
its decision as elucidating clearer guidelines for Fourth Amendment cases. One reason 
the Court feels obligated to clarity is the reliance lower courts place on Supreme Court 
decisions. The Court in Mapp v. Ohio also talk about this concept. Justice Black 
continued : 
The courts of the country are entitled to know with as much certainty as possible 
what scope they cover. The Court’s opinion, in my judgment, dissipates the doubt 
and uncertainty in this field of constitutional law and I am persuaded, for this and 
other reasons stated, to depart from my prior views, to accept the Boyd doctrine as 
controlling in this state case and to join the Court’s judgment and opinion which 
are in accordance with that constitutional doctrine.98 
 
The Supreme Court assumes their precedent as binding to lower courts, and conflicting 
precedents cloud the lower courts’ ability to make consistent decisions throughout the 
country. Thus, the Court chose to overturn the source of confusion. 
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Six years later in 1967, in Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court overruled Perez v. Brownell by 
deciding that section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act violated both the Fifth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. In Justice Black’s majority decision, he 
cited Perez as, “That case, decided by a 5-4 vote almost 10 years ago, has been a source 
of controversy and confusion ever since…”99 Because the Court determined that Perez 
caused “controversy and confusion,” they decided to revisit the ruling of the case. 
Though the Court did not cite confusion as the reason for overturning Perez, it is the 
basis of the decision to reconsider its adjudication. 
 
Obeying Public Opinion 
The Warren Court also cites the familiar principle of public disdain for a decision as a 
reason for its invalidation. In that same case, Afroyim v. Rusk, Justice Black discussed the 
role Perez’s public unpopularity played in its re-examination. He said, “…many 
commentators, have cast great doubt upon the soundness of Perez. Upon these 
circumstances, we granted certiorari to reconsider it.”100 Though Justice Black mentioned 
other considerations, such as subsequent Supreme Court decisions, his specific mention 
of commentators and the controversy caused by Perez indicates the importance of public 
acceptance.  
Justice Harlan used a similar reasoning two years prior in 1965 in Swift & Co. v. 
Wickham. The decision in this case overturned Kesler v. Department of Public Safety in 
part. In his majority decision, Justice Harlan said, “Not only has [Kesler] been uniformly 
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criticized by commentators, but lower courts have quite evidently sought to avoid dealing 
with its application or have interpreted it with uncertainty.”101 Justice Harlan echoes the 
reliance on public opinion that many other prior Courts cited in their reasoning to 
overturn precedent. The public’s disapproval of Kesler and the lower court’s 
unwillingness to apply or doubting of Kesler indicates that the three-year-old precedent 
was made incorrectly, and it should be reconsidered. 
 
Conclusion 
The Warren Court’s decided to overturn precedent at a much higher rate than any 
iteration of the Supreme Court preceding it. During his sixteen years as Chief Justice, 
Earl Warren’s Court used thirty-six cases to overturn fifty-one Supreme Court 
precedents. Despite this unprecedented use of judicial power, the Warren Court 
mentioned precedents and explained its reasoning for overturning precedent in much 
more detail than prior Supreme Courts. In fact, most decisions were formatted by the 
Court first analyzing the precedent and its decisions for overturning the prior case, and 
then, delving into the merits of the case. This decision structure indicates the binding 
nature of precedent more so than any other previous Supreme Court. The Courts serving 
from 1789 to 1953 often only mention precedent as an afterthought or formality. Despite 
criticisms of judicial activism, the Warren Court unprecedently reveals the Supreme 
Court’s thought process of prior precedent.  
  
 
101 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124 (1965). 
 53 
CHAPTER 6 
The Burger Court (1969-1986) 
 
The Burger Court, which endured for seventeen years from 1969 to 1986, maintained 
similar reasons for overturning prior precedent as Warren’s Court. Much like the types of 
cases presented to the Supreme Court during this time period, the decisions in this era 
that overturn precedent look, more often than not, like a random amalgamation of 
reasonings instead of a consistent jurisprudence regarding stare decisis.  
 
Abandoning Poor Policy 
Though not as dominant as in the Warren Court, policy considerations made their 
way into this more conservative Court’s jurisprudence. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail 
Clerks Union, Local 770 in 1970, the Court overruled Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson 
decided in 1962. By doing so, the Supreme Court granted the judiciary the ability to 
provide injunctive relief when a union staged a strike despite the union’s collective 
bargaining agreement with the company that required any dispute be resolved through 
arbitration. Although the Court provided many justifications for overturning Sinclair, the 
Court mentioned policy considerations multiple times in their decision. Justice Brennan 
wrote, “Furthermore, in light of developments subsequent to Sinclair, in particular our 
decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, it has become clear that the Sinclair decision does 
not further but rather frustrates realization of an important goal of our national policy.”102 
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Sinclair’s hindrance of the nation’s labor policy motivated the Court to overturn it. 
However, the Court uses this justification at a significantly lower rate than the Warren 
Court.  
 
Obeying Congressional Power 
Unlike its extensive use of policy as justification for disobeying stare decisis, the 
Warren Court discussion of Congress’ role in overturning precedent continued in this era. 
In Justice Brennan’s majority decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 
Local 770, he said: 
Nor can we agree that conclusive weight should be accorded to the failure of 
Congress to respond to Sinclair on the theory that congressional silence should be 
interpreted as acceptance of the decision. The Court has cautioned that ‘(i)t is at 
best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a 
controlling rule of law.’ Therefore, in the absence of any persuasive 
circumstances evidencing a clear design that congressional inaction has been 
taken as acceptance of Sinclair, the mere silence of Congress is not a sufficient 
reason for refusing to reconsider the decision.103 
 
While decisions of prior Courts revealed the Supreme Court’s reliance on Congress’s 
action or inaction as evidence of their approval or disapproval of a certain statutory or 
constitutional interpretation,104 this Court drastically changes this tradition of considering 
Congress. In fact, according to this decision, Congress’ inaction does not prove any 
opinion of a prior decision.  
On the other hand, Congress’ action may prove helpful in discerning their true 
intention with respect to the statute in question. For example, in Braden v. 30th Judicial 
Circuit Court of Kentucky, the Supreme Court expanded the district courts’ jurisdiction 
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on writs of habeas corpus due to Congress’ amendments to the habeas corpus statute. In 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion, he cited two changes to the habeas corpus statute that 
explicitly expands a prisoner’s right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a different 
district than where he is confined. Justice Brennan used this as evidence of congressional 
disapproval of their previous interpretation of the judiciary’s jurisdiction over writs of 
habeas corpus in Ahrens v. Clark. In his decision, he wrote: 
In enacting these amendments, Congress explicitly recognized the substantial 
advantages of having these cases resolved in the court which originally imposed 
the confinement or in the court located nearest the site of the underlying 
controversy. And Congress has further challenged the theoretical underpinnings 
of the decision by codifying in habeas corpus statute a procedure we sanctioned in 
Walker v. Johnston, whereby a petition for habeas corpus can in many instances 
be resolved without requiring the presence of the petitioner before the court that 
adjudicates his claim.105 
 
Congress’ clear expansion of habeas corpus through their amendments made after Ahrens 
acts as a clarification of their intent and desire for the habeas corpus statute. Despite the 
United States’ unique separation of powers scheme, the Supreme Court seems dependent 
on the other two branches for its institutional legitimacy. More specifically, when the 
Court’s ideology strays from that of the other two branches, the Court is less likely to 
overturn federal statutes enacted by Congress.106 In this case, the Supreme Court likely 
decided in favor of a newly enacted congressional statute over their own judicial 
precedent to maintain legitimacy among the political turmoil in 1973. 
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Abandoning Eroded Decisions 
Another familiar justification that is mentioned frequently in the Burger Court cases 
is the undermining by subsequent decisions. Even the above paragraphs allude to some 
reliance on more recent precedent over more distant ones. For example, in Andrews v. 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., the Court overturned Moore v. Illinois Central 
heavily supported by the fact that subsequent decisions did not adhere to Moore. In 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, he said, “The related doctrine expressed in Moore 
and Koppal, that a railroad employee’s action for breach of an employment contract is 
created and governed by state law, has been likewise undercut by later decisions.”107 
Justice Rehnquist goes on to cite three Supreme Court decisions from 1957, 1963, and 
1965 that held that arbitration clauses, as other employment contracts, are enforceable, 
which directly contradicts Moore, which was decided in 1941. When the Court has to 
decide between two conflicting Supreme Court decisions, the more recent precedent 
likely implicitly overruled the earlier one. However, the later cases illustrated the 
unsettled nature of the law, which required the Court to expressly overturn Moore in 
1972.  
In 1978, the Court more directly revealed their preference for more recent precedent. 
In Department of Revenue of State of Washington v. Association of Washington 
Stevedoring Companies, the Court overturned Puget Sound Stevedoring Company v. State 
Tax Commission and Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Companies. Through this 
decision, the Court determined that State tax laws that taxed companies conducting 
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interstate commerce did not violate the Commerce Clause. In Justice Blackmun’s 
majority opinion, he wrote: 
Because the tax in the present case is indistinguishable from the taxes at issue in 
Puget Sound and in Carter & Weekes, the Stevedoring Cases control today’s 
decision on the Commerce Clause issue unless more recent precedent and a new 
analysis require rejection of their reasoning. We conclude that Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady … requires such rejection.108 
 
The Court used a verdict decided the year prior as a tool to reject the decisions in Puget 
Sound and in Carter & Weekes.  A more recent precedent that contradicted a prior 
decision, though did not expressly overrule it, is synonymous with a new legal analysis. 
Thus, when the Supreme Court is forced to decide between two contrasting precedents, 
the more recent precedent will more likely than not win out. In fact, a precedent of this 
kind “requires” it. 
Similarly, in North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, the 
Court unanimously upheld North Dakota’s permitting requirements for pharmacists. In 
Justice Douglas’ majority opinion, he wrote that: 
Liggett, decided in 1928, belongs to that vintage of decisions which exalted 
substantive due process by striking down state legislation which a majority of the 
Court deemed unwise. Liggett has to date not been expressly overruled. We 
commented on it disparagingly, however, in Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. 
Co., which concerned the constitutionality of a state statute providing that life 
insurance companies and their agents may not operate an undertaking business 
and undertakers may not serve as agents for life insurance companies.109 
 
The Court’s move away from Liggett and similar cases has been documented in their 
more recent decisions. Justice Douglas hints at the slow process of overturning a 
decision, which starts with a distinction or the disparagement of the prior decision. 
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Justice Douglas further emphasized the bigger influence of more recent decisions over a 
current decision than older decisions. He wrote, “The Liggett case was a creation at war 
with the earlier constitutional view of legislative power, and opposed to our more recent 
decisions.”110 While the Court clearly places a premium on more recent decisions, Justice 
Douglas justified his decision by juxtaposing it with “the earlier constitutional view of 
legislative power.” Even though more distant decisions are clearly discounted, relying on 
older views and principles provided legitimacy to the overturning of forty-five-year-old 
precedent. 
 
Obeying Tradition 
As the Court alluded to in North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug 
Stores, the Court will often overturn precedent if it broke with prior Supreme Court 
decisions or precedent. For example, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., the 
Court rejected U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company because it departed from traditional 
standards. Justice Powell wrote, “Schwinn itself was an abrupt and largely unexplained 
departure from White Motor Co. v. United States, where only four years earlier the Court 
has refused to endorse a per se rule for vertical restrictions.”111 Despite the Court’s 
practice of generally abiding by more recent precedent than its predecessor, the Court 
appealed to tradition. In fact, according to Professor Rebecca Brown at Vanderbilt Law 
School, “tradition…has been an important source of authority for almost all schools of 
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constitutional interpretation.”112 The Court’s use of tradition, ironically, lent it legitimacy 
in abandoning stare decisis.  
 
Abandoning Equal Treatment Between Constitutional and Statutory Cases 
The Burger Court also emphasized the differences between overturning a 
constitutional decision as opposed to a statutory decision. In Edelman v. Jordan in 1974, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution prohibited the 
federal court from ordering retroactive payments of disability to citizens that had been 
wrongfully withheld. In his majority decision, Justice Rehnquist said, “Since we deal 
with a constitutional question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis 
than we are in other areas of the law.”113 As noted previously, the Court is more able to 
overturn established constitutional doctrines because Congress is less able to correct the 
Court’s misinterpretation because it can only be done through amendment, which is a 
lengthy and often unsuccessful process. However, Justice Rehnquist’s wording also 
implies that, while the Court is freer to respond to constitutional questions without the 
hindrance of stare decisis, the Court is more inhibited by precedent when answering 
general statutory questions. In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist also footnotes Justice 
Brandeis’ famous quote about stare decisis. He wrote: 
In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis: ‘Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, 
because in most matters it is important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right…This is commonly true even where the 
error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by 
legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction 
through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often 
overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience 
 
112 Rebecca L. Brown, “Tradition and Insight,” The Yale Law Journal 103, no. 1 (October 1993): 178. 
113 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).  
 60 
and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and 
error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial 
function.114 
 
While this footnote reiterates the Court’s reasoning for giving stare decisis less 
consideration in constitutional cases, it also depicts the Supreme Court as more pragmatic 
than idealistic. The Supreme Court understands the American system and its political 
barriers. Professor Mark Kende at Drake University Law School defined constitutional 
pragmatism as “[acknowledging] that the traditional modalities of constitutional 
interpretation do not answer the hardest constitutional questions.”115 In fact, he explained 
that, “pragmatism does a better job of describing how the influential, and at times 
revolutionary, U.S. Supreme Court decides cases than either originalism or living 
constitutionalism—two of the more popular theories.”116 Thus, when the practice of stare 
decisis cannot solve the practical problems of society, the Court veers from precedent. 
 
Obeying Societal Change 
Another large justification used in the Burger Court’s overturning of precedent is 
social change. In other words, society looks vastly different than when the statute or 
constitutional doctrine was first interpreted; thus, the Court must adjust to reflect that 
societal change. For example, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court held that the Louisiana 
State Constitution provision that barred women from serving on juries unless they had 
previously expressed their desire to serve on a jury violated a person’s Sixth Amendment 
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right to be tried by a jury of their peers. In Justice White’s majority opinion, the Court 
reasoned that, “It is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for 
each and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any women 
from their present duties.”117 The Court further explained the rationale in the decision 
made fourteen years prior that women were often seen “as the center of home and family 
life;”118 however, the Court goes on to cite statistics that show how that is no longer true. 
In this footnote, the Court explained that the number of women entering the workforce is 
increasing substantially. According to the Court, the exclusion of women on juries was 
upheld for the benefit of the family, but with women working at the rate they are, their 
absence in the home is no longer regarded as detrimental to the home. The Court further 
explained that, while they are overturning Hoyt v. Florida, it was not necessarily wrongly 
decided. Justice White wrote, “If it was ever the case that women were unqualified to sit 
on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required to perform jury service, 
that time has long since passed.”119 The Court conceded that this decision may not have 
been erroneous in 1961, but in 1975, it cannot be upheld as good law.  
Even in dissenting decisions that advocate against the overturning of precedent 
indicate that societal change is a necessary aspect of proving the need to abandon stare 
decisis. In Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Company in 
1977, Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion stated, “Yet today’s majority does not 
contend either that circumstances have changed since 1973 or that experience has shown 
Hughes and Bonelli to be unworkable. Nor does the majority attempt to explain why a 
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result it find so clearly commanded by our earlier cases was almost unanimously rejected 
by this Court twice in the last decade.”120 Justice Marshall laid out justifications for 
overturning such young precedent, including its incompatibility with the current decision 
or a circumstantial shift since the decision. He argued that because there had not been any 
significant societal change in the three years since Hughes or Bonelli, and because the 
majority had not explained why their decision was entirely inconsistent with the prior 
decision, these precedents should not be overturned.  
 
Obeying Public Opinion 
As with other Supreme Court eras, the Burger Court constantly relied on public 
opinion and the lower courts’ opinion to determine whether their prior decision was 
erroneous. For example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court frequently cited 
the lower court’s decision as justification for the precedent’s illegitimacy. In the Court’s 
majority decision, Justice Rehnquist quoted the District Court’s initial opinion: 
The District Court stated it was ‘troubled’ by the appellants’ contentions that the 
amendments would intrude upon the States’ performance of essential 
governmental functions. The Court went on to say that it considered their 
contentions ‘substantial and that it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it 
appropriate to draw back from the far-reaching implications of [Maryland v. 
Wirtz]; but that is a decision that only the Supreme Court can make, and as a 
Federal district court we feel obliged to apply the Wirtz opinion as it stands.’121 
 
Although the District Court applied Wirtz, it only did so because of vertical stare decisis 
doctrine. It spoke negatively of the Wirtz decision, but left the judgment on its reversal to 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court took the District Court’s clear disapproval of 
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Maryland v. Wirtz into consideration when deciding whether or not to overturn it. While 
the District Court upheld Wirtz in its opinion, it urged the Supreme Court to revise 
Congress’ role in regulating the minimum wages of state employees. The District Court’s 
plea to the Supreme Court indicated their belief that Wirtz was wrongly decided.  
The Court similarly cites lower courts’ disdain for their precedent in United States v. 
Reliable Transfer Company, Inc. In a unanimous decision for the Court, Justice Stewart 
wrote, “While the lower federal court originally adhered to the divided damages rule, 
they have more recently followed it only grudgingly, terming it ‘unfair,’ ‘illogical,’ 
‘arbitrary,’ ‘archaic and frequently unjust.’…Some courts, even bolder, have simply 
ignored the rule.”122 The lower courts’ unwillingness and refusal to abide by the 
precedent set out by the Supreme Court acted as a signal that the prior decision was 
erroneously decided. The lower courts’ behavior defeats the purpose of stare decisis of 
consistency and predictability in the law. Thus, stare decisis was irrelevant in the 
consideration of The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson. Furthermore, this decision reveals 
that vertical stare decisis is not as strong as its perceived to be.  
 
Abandoning Decisions That Have Unforeseen Consequences  
The Burger Court reasoned that a precedent could be overturned if the decision 
carried the potential for unintended, negative consequences. For example, in Perez v. 
Campbell, the Supreme Court overturned Kesler v. Department of Public Safety because 
it could lead to nullification. Justice White wrote: 
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Apart from the fact that is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our 
Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify 
nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative 
committee report articulating some state interest or policy—other than frustration 
of the federal objective—that would be tangentially furthered by the proposed 
state law. In view of the consequences, we certainly would not apply the Kesler 
doctrine in all Supremacy Clause cases.123 
 
In Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, the Supreme Court held that Utah’s refusal to 
restore Mr. Kesler’s license and vehicle registration after he had failed to pay his 
judgment even though he had filed for bankruptcy was constitutional. The holding in 
Kesler allowed Utah to abandon the federal Bankruptcy Act when it rivaled Utah’s Motor 
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. In Perez, the Court recognized that allowing states to 
abandon federal legislation in pursuance of their own state laws set a bad example for 
other states and frustrated the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. Justice White quoted the 
dissent in Kesler. He said: 
Whatever the purpose of the Utah Act, its ‘plain and inevitable effect [was] to 
create a powerful weapon for collection of a debt from which [the] bankrupt [had] 
been released by federal law. Such a result, they argued, left ‘the States free to 
impair an important and historic policy of this Nation embodied in its bankruptcy 
laws.’124 
 
Upholding Kesler would allow states to nullify federal laws, even ones that advance 
important national ideals. This reasoning builds off of the social detriment justification 
presented in the Warren Court. Instead of merely relying on the experience of applying a 
precedent, this Court anticipates potential societal damage caused by the application of 
precedent, though it had not manifested yet. 
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The Supreme Court similarly used a precedent’s consequences in order to overturn it 
in Batson v. Kentucky. This case overturned Swain v. Alabama, which held that the 
defendant must prove overwhelming evidence of purposeful racial discrimination on a 
jury selection. Imperfect racial representation on a jury was not enough to void a trial 
jury. Seven members of the Court agreed that the consequences of Swain were too severe 
to uphold the decision. In Justice Powell’s majority decision, he said, “Since this 
interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, prosecutors’ 
peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny.”125 The 
Court recognized the impracticability of the initial decision, and used this social 
detriment as justification for Swain ’s reversal.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Burger Court did not present many new justifications for overturning precedent. 
Instead, it built on prior iterations of the Supreme Court’s reasonings. However, the 
Burger Court overturned more precedents than any prior Court. However, the Burger 
Court’s abandonment of stare decisis was instrumental in the advancement of American 
society. Law Professor Albert Altschuler, said, “Burger Court rulings, like the Warren 
Court, contributed to important transformations in American life.”126 However, just as the 
Burger Court advanced society, it also reflected American society’s “post-Vietnam, post-
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Watergate sense of drift.”127 The Burger Court uniquely revealed how Supreme Court 
decisions affect society and how societal developments impact Supreme Court decisions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) 
 
The Rehnquist is criticized more than any other iteration of the Supreme Court for its 
treatment of prior decisions. Justice Rehnquist’s leadership of the Supreme Court has 
been subject of scathing condemnations from legal scholars for “overruling 
democracy”128 and, ironically, for judicial activism.129 While the Rehnquist Court did not 
overturn the greatest number of cases, it included the most significant discussion of stare 
decisis by far. It discussed its reasonings for abandoning precedent in more depth and 
more consistently than any prior Supreme Court. However, the Rehnquist Court did not 
break with prior Court’s reasonings for overturning precedent. Rather, the Court built and 
expanded on the justifications. The Court discussed familiar reasonings including a case’s 
abandoning of prior decisions, its erosion by subsequent decisions, case subjects, 
congressional power, public opinion, and societal change.  
 
Obeying Tradition 
One justification for abandoning stare decisis that the Rehnquist Court maintains 
from previous eras is the precedent’s departure from prior Supreme Court decisions and 
philosophies. For example, in U.S. v. Dixon, Justice Scalia explicitly overturned Grady v. 
Corbin, and he cited its divergence from prior Supreme Court decisions such as Gavieres 
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v. United States. In his decision, he said, “The ‘same-conduct’ rule [Grady v. Corbin] 
announced is wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear 
common-law understanding of double jeopardy.”130 In addition to the decision in Grady 
v. Corbin departing from a prior Supreme Court decision, it also digressed from the 
general understanding of double jeopardy. Traditionally, the Fifth Amendment protection 
against double jeopardy prohibits the government from prosecuting an individual for a 
crime twice. In Grady v. Corbin, the Supreme Court ruled that an individual could not 
endure a prosecution for a greater charge after the defendant plead guilty to a lesser 
charge. In this case decided only three years prior to Dixon, Justice Scalia dissented and 
said that Double Jeopardy has been largely understood to prevent double prosecution for 
the same offense, not the same action. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Dixon implies 
that a decision’s violation of prior precedent does not necessarily hinder the Court from 
affirming the decision. However, its noncompliance with the general understanding of the 
law causes the court to overturn the more recent decision in favor of prior precedent.  
Something that is clearer in the decisions of the Rehnquist Court than from prior 
courts is their inherent trust of older decisions, which drives this inclination to overturn 
cases that abandon older decisions. For example, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña 
in 1995, the Supreme Court decided to overturn Metro Broadcasting v. FCC based on 
prior decisions relating to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In her 
majority decision, Justice O’Connor wrote: 
Remaining true to an ‘intrinsically sounder’ doctrine established in prior cases 
serves the values of stare decisis than would following a more recently decided 
case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it; the latter course would 
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simply compound the recent error and would likely make the unjustified break 
from previously established doctrine complete.131  
 
Although Justice O’Connor distinguishes between sound and less sound cases, she makes 
a point to mention the cases’ age as implications of legitimacy. In the same case, she goes 
on to say “We do not face a precedent [that has engendered substantial reliance], because 
Metro Broadcasting itself departed from our prior cases—and did so quite recently. By 
refusing to follow Metro Broadcasting, then, we do not depart from the fabric of the law; 
we restore it.”132 The Court felt that by overturning such a recent precedent, they did not 
incur the same damage as overturning an older, and more relied upon precedent would 
cause. The Court places an inherent value on older decisions. 
 
Abandoning Eroded Decisions 
The Rehnquist Court’s high view of older decisions is sharply contrasted with its 
overturning of precedent on the basis that it has been eroded by subsequent decisions. For 
example, in Agostini v. Felton in 1997, the Court overturned its 1984 decision, Aguilar v. 
Felton, which determined that New York City’s use of federal Title I funding toward 
parochial school employees’ salaries was a violation of the Establishment Clause. In her 
majority opinion, Justice O’Connor justified the overturning of Aguilar by saying, “The 
doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude us from recognizing the change in our law and 
overruling Aguilar and those portions of Ball inconsistent with our more recent 
decisions.”133 According to Justice O’Connor, the more recent decisions delineate a 
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“change in, or subsequent development of, our constitutional law.”134 These statements, 
however, starkly contrast with her earlier statements made in Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Peña that stare decisis requires the Court to overturn more recent cases that  
However, the Court also makes the usefulness of subsequent decisions clear in their 
opinions. For example, in 1989, the Court overruled the 1969 decision North Carolina v. 
Pearce, which ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents 
the courts from increasing a prisoner’s sentence on retrial on the basis that it is 
considered vindictive. Alabama v. Smith, however, reverses this due to subsequent cases. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion reasons that, “While the Pearce opinion appeared on 
its face to announce a rule of sweeping dimension, our subsequent cases have made clear 
that its presumption of vindictiveness ‘[do]es not apply in every case where a convicted 
defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.’”135 Later Supreme Court decisions, such 
as Texas v. McCullough,136 proved to the Court that judicial vindictiveness is not inherent 
in the judiciary’s decision to impose a greater sentence after retrial. Subsequent cases 
with slightly different facts can reveal the unanticipated complexities in a prior case’s 
ruling.  
Similarly, in Hudson v. United States in 1997, the Supreme Court unanimously 
overruled United States v. Halper, which was a unanimous opinion decided in only 8 
years prior. The Court initially ruled that imposing significant civil damages on an 
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individual who had already been criminally charged and convicted, constituted a 
violation of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. However, according to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist: 
We believe that Halper’s deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles 
was ill considered. As subsequent cases have demonstrated, Halper’s test for 
determining whether a particular sanction is ‘punitive,’ and thus subject to the 
strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause, has proved unworkable. We have since 
recognized that all civil penalties have some deterrent effect.137 
 
The Supreme Court used earlier cases, such as Department of Revenue of Montana v. 
Kurth Ranch and United States v. Ursery to illustrate its doubt of Halper’s punitive test. 
In Halper, the Supreme Court determined that any fines unrelated to sustained damages 
such as those in pursuance of retribution or deterrence were to be considered punitive. 
However, the Court later recognized the impracticality of this holding.  
Although the Court constantly changes its favor of older versus more recent 
precedent, the Court is able to reconcile the seeming contradiction between preferring 
older precedent and subsequent decisions in Hudson v. United States. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist said, “the analysis applied by the Halper Court deviated from our traditional 
double jeopardy doctrine…”138 Thus, the Court applies the value of older precedent and 
more recent precedent as justifications for overturning a lone deviating opinion.  
 
Abandoning Equal Treatment Between Constitutional and Statutory Cases 
Additionally, the Rehnquist Court builds upon prior courts’ distinction between case 
subjects. The Court reinforces the difference in approach between constitutional and 
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statutory cases. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, 
“Our willingness to reconsider our earlier decision have been ‘particularly true in 
constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through legislative action is 
practically impossible.’’”139 The Court legitimizes its abandonment of prior precedent 
due to the difficulty of overturning it through any other legal means. The Court further 
reinforces prior iterations of the Court by placing an increased scrutiny on statutory cases. 
Justice Scalia argued this in his dissent in Hohn v. United States in 1998. He wrote, “Of 
course even if one accepts that the two factors off the Court alludes to (procedural ruling 
plus absence of full briefing or argument) reduce House’s stare decisis effect, one must 
still acknowledge that its stare decisis effect is increased by the fact that it was a 
statutory holding.”140 For the same reason the Court considers itself less bound by stare 
decisis in constitutional cases, it considers stare decisis to be more rigid in statutory 
cases: Congress is more able to fix the Supreme Court’s erroneous decisions in statutory 
cases than in constitutional ones.  
The Rehnquist Court makes further distinctions between cases, namely procedural 
and antitrust cases. In 1993, Michael Gaudin was charged and convicted with making 
false statements on federal loan documents. The District Court, however, determined that 
the court was to decide materiality of facts, such as whether Gaudin’s false statements 
were significantly related to the Housing and Urban Development’s decisions. The 
Supreme Court overruled this decision, thereby, overruling Sinclair v. United States and 
Kungys v. United States. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist said,  
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We do not want to minimize the role that stare decisis played in our 
jurisprudence. That role is somewhat reduced, however, in the case of a 
procedural rule such as this, which does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior. It 
is reduced all the more when the rule is not only procedural but rests upon an 
interpretation of the Constitution. And we think stare decisis cannot possibly be 
controlling when, in addition to those factors, the decision in question has been 
proved manifestly erroneous, and its underpinnings eroded, by subsequent 
decisions of this Court.141 
 
According to the Supreme Court, depriving the jury from considering materiality violated 
the defendants Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and to a jury trial, 
respectively. The Court’s foundation of the materiality procedure in the Constitution 
allows the Court to more freely ignore the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Additionally, the Rehnquist Court further distinguished antitrust cases from other 
statutory cases. In State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Court overruled the 1968 decision Albrecht 
v. Herald Co., which prohibited price-fixing entirely. In her unanimous decision, Justice 
O’Connor wrote, “Although the rule of Albrecht has been in effect for some time, the 
inquiry we must undertake requires considering ‘ ‘the effect of the antitrust laws upon 
vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today.’ ’”142 Antitrust laws are 
purposed to encourage economic competition; thus, the Court considers an antitrust law’s 
effect on the economy. Because of economic fluctuations, stare decisis is not as strong as 
in traditional statutory cases. This new distinction breaks with the Court’s traditional 
justification for differentiating types of cases when determining the strength of stare 
decisis. Unlike constitutional cases, antitrust laws are much easier to correct through 
congressional action. According to traditional judiciary practice, stare decisis is 
considerably weaker in constitutional cases than in statutory cases. According to Brian 
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Kalt, a legal scholar and professor at Michigan State School of Law, “the court is the 
institutional actor best to fix [wrongly decided constitutional cases].”143 He also notes the 
incredible strength stare decisis has in statutory cases.144 
 
Obeying Congressional Power 
The Court affirms this view that congressional issues require unique consideration of 
stare decisis. For example, in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota By and Through 
Heitkamp, Justice Stevens justified the Court’s decision to uphold a potentially erroneous 
precedent because of Congress’ ability to reverse the Court’s decision through legislation. 
In this nearly unanimous decision, the Court refused to entirely overturn National Bellas 
Hess v.  Illinois. In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens said that deciding to maintain 
the rule set out in Bellas Hess “is made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is not 
only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has 
the ultimate power to resolve.”145 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia detailed 
Congress’s ability to easily overturn Supreme Court decisions through legislation. He 
said, “Congress has the final say over regulation of interstate commerce, and it can 
change the rule of Bellas Hess by simply saying so. We have long recognized that the 
doctrine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Congress remained free to alter what 
we have done.’”146 Because the Court recognizes Congress’ ability to overturn erroneous 
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precedent, the Rehnquist Court does not believe it should act on behalf of Congress and 
assume what they believe Congress wants the law to be.  
Although the Court declines to fully overturn Bellas Hess in Quill Corporation v. 
North Dakota, Justice White, who partially concurred and partially dissented explained 
that the Court : 
[R]epudiates that aspect of our decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue of Illinois, which restricts, under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the power of the States to impose use tax 
collection responsibilities on out-of-state mail-order businesses that do not have a 
‘physical presence’ in the State.147  
 
So, although the Court did not entirely overturn Bellas Hess, it strongly dismantled the 
core of decision. When the Court considers whether to overturn a statutory precedent, 
they often question Congress’ lack of action. The Rehnquist Court determined that “in 
recent years Congress has considered legislation that would ‘overrule’ the Bellas Hess 
rule. Its decision not to act in this direction may, of course, have been dictated by respect 
for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due Process Clause prohibits States from 
imposing such taxes…”148 The Court does not consider Congress’ inaction as evidence of 
their approval of Bellas Hess. Although the Court gave Congress the freedom to decide 
whether to overturn Bellas Hess, by pointing out and discussing its erroneous merits, they 
urged Congress to overturn it. 
This refusal to step in for what the Court believed to be a congressional power 
sharply contrasts with the prior Courts’ view of congressional inaction. In James v. 
United States, Chief Justice Warren wrote: 
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We believe Wilcox was wrongly decided and we find nothing in congressional 
history since then to persuade us that Congress intended to legislate the rule. 
Thus, we believe that we should now correct the error and the confusion resulting 
from it, certainly if we do so in a manner that will not prejudice those who might 
have relied on it.149 
 
Although Wilcox engendered significant reliance, was a statutory concern, and Congress 
did not intend to change the Court’s initial decision, the Court found that its erroneous 
opinion should be corrected. Congress was unable to fix the Court’s erroneous decision; 
thus, the Court took it upon itself to restore good law.  
Similarly, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, Justice Brennan 
recognized that congressional inaction does not connote approval of the decision. In his 
majority opinion, he said: 
We [cannot] agree that conclusive weight should be accorded to the failure of 
Congress to respond to Sinclair on the theory that congressional silence should be 
interpreted as acceptance of the decision. The Court has cautioned that ‘(i)t is at 
best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a 
controlling rule of law.’ Therefore, in the absence of any persuasive 
circumstances evidencing a clear design that congressional inaction has been 
taken as acceptance of Sinclair, the mere silence of Congress is not a sufficient 
reason for refusing to reconsider the decision.150 
 
The Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts all consider congressional inaction to be 
indicative of their approval of a decision; however, they took different approaches to 
congressional nonintervention. The Warren Court took it upon itself to overturn cases 
because Congress refused to act; the Burger Court, while not using congressional 
inactivity as a reason for overturning, did not let their inaction prevent the Court from 
reconsidering prior precedent. The Rehnquist Court, on the other hand, used 
congressional inaction to support a change in legislation.  
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Obeying Public Opinion 
The Rehnquist Court continues to follow its antecedents by valuing the opinion of 
legal scholars and lower courts. In his unanimous majority decision in Gulfstream 
Aerospace Corporation v. Mayacamas Corporation, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
comments on the Court’s consideration of public opinion. He said: 
[T]he lower federal courts have repeatedly lambasted the Enelow-Ettelson 
doctrine. The rule has been called ‘a remnant from the jurisprudential attic,’ ‘an 
anachronism wrapped up in an atavism,’ and a ‘Byzantine peculiarit[y].’ With the 
exception of the Federal Circuit, which apparently has not yet confronted 
an Enelow-Ettelson appeal, every Circuit is on record with criticism of the 
doctrine. One Circuit Judge has urged his court to reject the doctrine 
outright. Although a majority of the panel declined to do so, it agreed that the 
Enelow-Ettelson rule was ‘artificial,’ ‘medieval,’ and ‘outmoded.’ Another 
Circuit Judge, in a majority opinion, recently wrote an extensive and scholarly 
critique of the doctrine and concluded only with great reluctance that repudiating 
the doctrine would be improper.151  
 
The Court used the abundant criticisms from lower courts of the Court’s precedent to 
build the case in favor of abandoning it. Justice Marshall goes on to discuss the criticisms 
of the doctrine from prominent legal scholars such as Professor James William Moore of 
Yale Law School and Professor Charles Alan Wright of University of Texas, Austin Law 
School. Harsh criticisms from these distinguished and well-known scholars lent 
credibility to the Court’s argument against their own precedent. By relying on the 
opinions of other legal scholars and a significant majority of lower courts, the Supreme 
Court demonstrates their sound decision-making that does not draw on their political 
preferences or ideological leanings. 
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Obeying Reliance Interests 
The Rehnquist Court also amplifies the effect reliance has on the judicial decision-
making process. Reliance is one of the most prevalent considerations for respecting a 
prior decision.152 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, the Court examined how its 
precedent, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, amassed public reliance. In Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion, she wrote, “We also note that reliance on a case that has 
recently departed from precedent is likely minimal, particularly where, as here, the rule 
set forth in that case is unlikely to affect primary conduct in any event.”153 Because the 
Court determined that Metro Broadcasting had recently departed from prior decisions, 
namely Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., they rejected the idea that the public heavily relied 
on the standards set out in Metro Broadcasting. However, the Court’s mentioning of the 
lack of reliance on Metro Broadcasting reinforces the importance of reliance when the 
Court considers overturning precedent.  
In the same vein, the Court has argued significant reliance on precedent as the main 
or sole reason for obeying stare decisis. For example, in Quill Corporation v. North 
Dakota By and Through Heitkamp, the Court distinguished between an overturned 
precedent, Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric, 
Co., and a similar case, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 
that was brought into question. Justice Stevens said: 
Second, unlike the Attelboro rule, we have, in our decisions, frequently relied on 
the Bellas Hess rule in the last 25 years, and we have never intimated in our 
review of sales or use taxes that Bellas Hess was unsound. Finally, again unlike 
the Attleboro rule, the Bellas Hess rule has engendered substantial reliance and 
has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry. The ‘interest in 
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stability and orderly development. Of the law’ that undergirds the doctrine of 
stare decisis, therefore counsels adherence to settled precedent.154 
 
Lower courts, as well as the public and commercial industries, have relied significantly 
on the Court’s decision in Bellas Hess. One purpose of stare decisis is to promote 
predictability within the law. The public, as well as businesses, should reasonably expect 
that similar cases be treated similarly by the courts.155 For that reason alone, the Court 
upholds the Bellas Hess decision on interstate commerce grounds.  
Similarly, the Court upheld Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey due the public’s expectation of their rights under the law. In 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, she said: 
While [Roe v. Wade] has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An 
entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in 
defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive 
decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left 
Roe’s central holding a doctrinal remnant.156  
 
Casey expands the reliance approach to precedent because it discusses the reliance of 
society as a whole instead of specific parties, such as those who have made similar 
contracts. The nineteen years between Roe v. Wade and Casey, women had grown 
accustomed to female agency that had been established in Roe. It had created a societal 
norm of  female decision-making that an entire generation, specifically women, had come 
to expect. The Court would harm society by reversing a precedent that a whole 
 
154 Quill Corporation, Inc., 504 U.S. at 317. 
155 Jordan Wilder Connors, “Treating like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied 
Judicial Methodology,” Columbia Law Review 108, no. 3 (April 2008): 688.  
156 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). 
 80 
generation, and much of the American public, had relied upon. Without predictability, the 
public would not have the ability to structure their lives.157 
 
Obeying Societal Change 
According to Professor Heather K. Gerken of Yale Law School, “the best way to 
understand the relationship between politics and law, then, is as interlocking gears 
moving us forward.”158 Just as the Supreme Court aids social movements, so do social 
movements impact the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. For example, in Atkins v. 
Virginia, the Supreme Court overturned Penry v. Lynaugh, which allowed the capital 
punishment of a mentally disabled individual. In his analysis, Justice Stevens used the 
fact that states have incrementally outlawed the sentencing of a mentally incapacitated 
person to death. He wrote:  
It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency 
of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is 
far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of 
violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally 
retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing legislation 
reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that 
today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable 
than the average criminal.159 
 
The changed societal views and growing compassion for the mentally handicapped 
individuals significantly impacted the Court’s decision against the capital punishment of 
such persons. However, the Eighth Amendment is uniquely dynamic. In 1958, the Court 
 
157 Hillel Y. Levin, “A Reliance Approach to Precedent,” Georgia Law Review 47, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 
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wrote in Trop v. Dulles that “the [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”160 The right 
from cruel and unusual punishment evolves as society’s perception of what is cruel and 
unusual evolves. The meaning of “cruel” and “unusual” is constantly changing because it 
“[signifies] something different than what is generally done,”161 and what is normally 
done is continuously changing. 
The Court used similar logic in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003. The Court overruled 
Bowers v. Hardwick, which permitted the criminalization of homosexual conduct. 
However, societal views of homosexuality changed drastically in the 17 years since 
Bowers. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion stated, “In our own constitutional system, 
the deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following its 
announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in 
Bowers decision are reduced now to 13 of which 4 enforce their laws only against 
homosexual conduct.”162 In the 17 years after the Court’s initial decision in Bowers, the 
number of states with laws prohibiting homosexual conduct dwindled. Just as in Atkins v. 
Virginia, state conduct demonstrated significant changes in societal views. These changes 
informed the Court’s change in interpretation. 
 
Conclusion 
The Rehnquist Court builds significantly on justifications for abandoning precedent 
put forward by prior iterations of the Court. By doing so, it reveals the enduring aspects 
 
160 Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
161 Id., n. 32. 
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of the Court’s jurisprudence with respect to stare decisis. The Rehnquist Court 
consistently emphasizes the importance and strength of societal acceptance on precedent. 
It paints society’s influence on a decision’s success as more dominant than any other 
justification. Ultimately, it reinforces the theory that public opinion plays a significant 
role in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and decision-making process, especially when 
considering the reversal of a precedent. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Roberts Court (2005-present) 
The Roberts’ Court has faced significant criticism for its apparent flippant overruling 
of precedent. Many critics perceive the current Supreme Court to be partisan and 
political. In particular, the media has framed every high-profile Supreme Court case as 
ideologically split and politically motivated. The media has latched on to the Court’s 
overturning of precedent as evidence for its clear partisanship.163 However, as of 2018, 
the Roberts’ Court has overturned fewer than 1 case per year.164 Although the reasonings 
the Roberts Court put forward for doing so build off of previous courts’ rationales, it also 
discusses new justifications such as reliance interests, settled expectations, and 
technological advancements. 
 
Obeying Settled Expectations 
The Roberts Court does give several reasons for abandoning stare decisis in certain 
circumstances. Since 2005, the Court most frequently cites reliance, or lack thereof, as a 
valid justification for overturning a prior decision. According to Professor Randy Kozel 
of Notre Dame Law School, reliance interests are a compelling reason for obeying stare 
decisis. He wrote that, “stakeholder reliance should occasionally persuade judges to 
accept interpretations of the law they would otherwise reject.”165 In Pearson v. Callahan, 
 
163 Andrew Chung, “Conservative U.S. Justices Draw Criticism by Overruling Precedent Again,” Reuters, 
21 June 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-precedent/conservative-u-s-justices-draw-
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164 According to the Congressional Research Service, there have been 8 cases that expressly overturn a 
prior Supreme Court decision, and my own research indicates 2 cases in 2018. Thus, the Roberts Court has 
used 10 cases to overturn a prior decision in its 13 years (as of 2018).  
165 Randy J. Kozel, “Precedent and Reliance,” Emory Law Journal 62 (2013): 1460. 
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the Court overruled a strict two-pronged rule set out in Saucier v. Katz for evaluating a 
government official’s qualified immunity claim after considering potential reliance 
interests on the precedent. The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials 
from being sued when acting within their capacity as a government official unless they 
clearly violated a citizen’s constitutional or statutory right.166 In the decision for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Alito wrote, “Revisiting precedent is particularly appropriate 
where, as here, a departure would not upset expectations, the precedent consists of a 
judge-made rule that was recently adopted to improve the operation of the courts, and 
experience has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”167 The Court said its 
reevaluation of Saucier is appropriate because changing the way in which courts assess a 
government official’s imposition on an individual’s rights does not change any settled 
expectations of previous or future parties. One of the main purposes of stare decisis is to 
protect the litigants’ plausible anticipations of consistency throughout the legal system.168  
The Court put forward a similar analysis in Montejo v. Louisiana in 2009. In this 
case, the Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, which held that any evidence obtained by 
the police after a suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel was inadmissible in court. In 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, he wrote: 
Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the 
principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance 
interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned. The first 
two cut in favor of abandoning Jackson: The opinion is only two decades old, and 
eliminating it would not upset expectations.169 
 
166 “Qualified Immunity,” Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School, 
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167 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009). 
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Binding Effects?” China Guiding Cases Project at Stanford Law School, Feb. 29, 2016, 
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According to the majority, the Court believed that the public did not actively rely on the 
protections set out in Jackson, which eliminates the hindrance of reliance from the 
Court’s consideration. 
In 2018, the Court continued the discussion of reliance interests in South Dakota v. 
Wayfair. In this case, a reliance interest was at stake and stood as an obstacle for the 
Court. In the decision, the Court overturned Quill Corporation v. North Dakota and 
National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, which dictated that 
corporations must be physically present in a state in order to be taxed by that state. 
Companies, and particularly e-commerce companies, understandably rely on this physical 
presence doctrine for their operations. The Court recognized that, “[r]eliance interests are 
a legitimate consideration when the Court weighs adherence to an earlier but flawed 
precedent.”170 This statement in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion implies that even a 
flawed or erroneous decision could be upheld if reliance interests are significant, as 
explained by Professor Kozel. However, Justice Kennedy and his irregular majority171 
distinguished between valid and invalid reliance interests. The Court concluded that: 
But even on its own terms, the physical presence rule as defined by Quill is no 
longer a clear or easily applicable standard, so arguments for reliance based on its 
clarity are misplaced. And, importantly, stare decisis accommodates only 
‘legitimately reliance interest[s].’ Here, the tax distortion created by Quill exists 
in large part because consumers regularly fail to comply with lawful use taxes.172 
 
According to the Court, online business’ and consumers’ reliance interest in avoiding 
taxation is an illegitimate reliance interest; thus, the influence of stare decisis does not 
 
170 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (2018). 
171 The majority in South Dakota v. Wayfair consisted of Justice Kennedy, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Alito, 
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Thomas. 
172 South Dakota, 138 U.S. at 2098. 
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bind the Court to its decision in Quill. So, while, reliance interests can outweigh a 
potentially wrong decision, it must be valid in that the change in the law would justifiably 
harm a person or their livelihood. 
 
Abandoning Equal Treatment Between Constitutional and Statutory Cases 
Based on this reliance doctrine, the Court differentiated the strength of stare decisis in 
certain types of cases such as contractual and procedural. The Court has traditionally 
decided that constitutional cases are less bound by precedent than cases regarding 
congressional statutes. The Roberts Court, however, further applied the burden of stare 
decisis to contractual or property cases. In Justice Alito’s majority decision in Pearson v. 
Callahan, he wrote, “‘Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases 
involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved; the opposite 
is true in cases …involving procedural and evidentiary rules’ that do not produce such 
reliance.”173 Justice Alito extracted this difference between property and contract cases 
and procedural and evidentiary cases from the reliance doctrine. In other words, the fact 
that the public understandably relies on decisions regarding a person’s right to property 
or contract. Thus, stare decisis is particularly strong in those cases. On the other hand, the 
general public does not tend to rely on the rules regarding court procedure or evidence; 
therefore, stare decisis is not necessarily applied or upheld. Justice Alito further 
expanded upon the differences in arguments depending on type of case. He said: 
Respondent argues that the Saucier procedure should not be reconsidered unless 
we conclude that its justification was ‘badly reasoned’ or that the rule has proved 
to be ‘unworkable’ but those standards, which are appropriate when a 
 
173 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233. 
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constitutional or statutory precedent is challenged, are out of place in the present 
context.174 
 
Because Pearson questions a procedure as opposed to a constitutional or statutory 
precedent, it is held to a lower standard of stare decisis. Thus, the traditional reasons for 
upholding precedent, such as workability or erroneousness, are not as relevant in this 
case. 
On the other hand, stare decisis cannot entirely be abandoned simply because the case 
does not concern a congressional statute. In Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United v. 
FEC, he argued that precedent should not be flippantly reevaluated simply because it 
concerns a constitutional interpretation. He wrote “Stare decisis protects not only 
personal rights involving property or contract but also the ability of the elected branches 
to shape their laws in an effective and coherent fashion.”175 He emphasized the 
importance of maintaining stare decisis in constitutional cases, even though the Court 
generally considers precedent to be less binding in cases regarding the Constitution. 
 
Obeying Societal Change 
A new justification the Court uses for overturning prior decisions is that 
advancements in technology requires an adjustment to the law. For example, in Citizens 
United v. FEC, Citizens United argued that its movie that criticized Hillary Clinton was 
electioneering communications, and the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act that 
limited campaign contributions for electioneering communications was unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed that limiting corporate campaign 
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contributions violated the corporations’ protected right to free speech. In Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion, he wrote: 
Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept 
of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech 
in certain media or by certain speakers. Today, 30-second television ads may be 
the most effective way to convey a political message.176 
 
In other words, the change in how speech is conducted, namely through television ads 
and potentially through blog posts, and social media, necessarily requires the Court to 
reevaluate their traditional stance on free speech and its speakers.  
Similarly, in South Dakota v. Wayfair, the Court was faced with determining the 
taxation policy for e-commerce companies. In deciding to allow States to tax e-commerce 
business with no physical presence in the State, the Court overruled a 1992 decision, 
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota. In the Court’s majority decision, the Court weighed 
the technological differences between 1992 and 2018 in its consideration for overturning 
Quill. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since 
then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more egregious and 
harmful. The Quill Court did not have before it the present realities of the 
interstate marketplace. In 1992, less than 2 percent of Americans has Internet 
access. Today that number is about 89 percent. When it decided Quill, the Court 
could not have envisioned a world in which the world’s largest retailer would be a 
remote seller. The Internet’s prevalence and power have changed the dynamics of 
the national economy.177 
 
Although the technological changes between 1992 and 2018 did not change the erroneous 
nature of the decision, the increase in Internet access and increase in e-commerce 
businesses made the decision more clearly wrong. The growth of the Internet made the 
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tax loss suffered by States more evident; thus, it has become more imperative to overturn 
such an overtly wrong precedent. 
 
Obeying Public Opinion 
In the last fifteen years, the Roberts Court has mentioned the public and judiciary’s 
opinion on its decisions, but less so than in previous eras. Only one case mentioned 
criticism in their decision: Pearson v. Callahan. In Justice Alito’s majority decision, he 
said, “Where a decision has ‘been questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions 
and [has] defied consistent application by the lower courts,’ these factors weight in favor 
of reconsideration.”178 The Supreme Court’s doubts in addition to the lower court’s 
hesitancy to apply the principle or outright condemnation of the decision in Saucier v. 
Katz indicates a potential wrong decision. Justice Alito further emphasizes the 
importance of lower courts’ approval of the decision due to their “firsthand experience 
bearing on its advantages and disadvantages.”179 In this particular case, the lower courts 
have seen the effects of enforcing the strict principle dictated in Saucier, and they can 
speak more extensively on its flaws. Thus, the Supreme Court trusted the opinion of the 
lower court when it criticized “Saucier’s ‘rigid order of battle.’”180 Decisions such as 
Justice Alito’s in Pearson confirm the theory that lower courts can influence Supreme 
Court decisions in a myriad of ways. Although this decision directly quotes and points to 
decisions of the lower court, studies have shown that the Supreme Court often uses 
language from lower court decisions  
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Obeying Tradition 
When overturning a precedent, the Roberts Court often mentions the precedent’s 
disruption of prior precedent. Therefore, by overturning the precedent, the Court is 
returning to the Court’s tradition. For example, in Citizens United v. FEC, the Court 
alluded to its reliance on Supreme Court decisions and principles before its controlling 
precedent. In his majority decision, Justice Kennedy wrote, “No case before Austin had 
held that Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political speech based on 
the speaker’s corporate identity. Before Austin, Congress had enacted legislation for this 
purpose, and the Government urged the same proposition before this court.”181 The cases, 
congressional and governmental actions prior to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce proved the case to be inconsistent with the practices of the government. 
Justice Kennedy further explained that “These considerations counsel in favor of 
rejecting Austin, which itself contravened this Court’s earlier precedents in Buckley and 
Bellotti.”182 Ironically, the precedent’s lack of reliance on stare decisis causes the Court 
to reject it as a controlling precedent. The Court rejects Austin because it represented a 
departure from Buckley, Bellotti, and the clear intention of the government as seen 
through congressional actions. 
The Court viewed older precedent as controlling as opposed to more recent precedent 
in Alleyne v. United States in 2013. Alleyne v. United States overruled Harris v. United 
States, a decision from 2002 that determined that judicial factfinding, or the judge’s 
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sentencing for acquitted or uncharged conduct,183 on top of a minimum sentence did not 
violate the Sixth Amendment right to a trial and sentencing by jury. In Harris, the 
majority distinguished between Harris and Apprendi v. New Jersey, though it did not 
overturn Apprendi. In his majority decision in Alleyne, Justice Thomas wrote, “Harris 
drew a distinction between facts that increase the statutory maximum and facts that 
increase only the mandatory minimum. We conclude that this distinction is inconsistent 
with our decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, and with the original meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment.”184 Unlike the Court in 2002, the 2018 Court determined that Harris and 
Apprendi could not coexist peacefully. Thus, according to the Court’s reading of the 
Sixth Amendment, Apprendi perpetrates the true meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and 
should, thus, be maintained as the controlling precedent over Harris.  
In Pearson v. Callahan, in addition to its lack of reliance interests, its procedural 
nature, and criticisms drawn from the judiciary, the Court further reasons that it broke 
with prior precedent. Justice Alito wrote, “Adherence to Saucier’s two-step protocol 
departs from the general rule of constitutional avoidance and runs counter to the ‘older, 
wiser judicial counsel ‘not to pass on questions of constitutionality…unless such 
adjudication is unavoidable.’’”185 Although Saucier did not directly contradict a prior 
Supreme Court decision, the decision broke with the Supreme Court’s tradition of 
allowing lower courts to decide procedures and customs independently.  
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Abandoning Eroded Decisions 
While adhering to tradition and prior precedent certainly lends the Court legitimacy, 
the Court also often found subsequent decisions more controlling. For example, in 
Alleyne v. United States, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion added to Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion, which lacked substantial discussion of stare decisis. She 
explained that, “In this context, stare decisis does not compel adherence to a decision 
whose ‘underpinnings’ have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent developments of constitutional 
law.”186 Later decisions tended to avoid applying the principles set out in Harris v. 
United States without expressly overturning it by distinguishing the cases on its facts, 
thus, establishing differing and somewhat contradictory principles. By doing so, the 
Court necessarily required that it would decide between the two principles in a later 
decision. The Court found that the subsequent principles became more controlling, 
therefore, eroding the decision in Harris.  
 
Abandoning Decisions That Have Unforeseen Consequences 
Lastly, the Court considers the threat of potential negative consequences when 
determining the strength of a precedent. In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court argued that 
upholding Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce would eventually spiral to the 
extreme limitation of free speech. Justice Kennedy wrote “Austin’s anti-distortion 
rationale would produce the dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that Congress 
could ban political speech of media corporations.”187 The decision in Austin v. Michigan 
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Chamber of Commerce held that limiting corporations’ funding to independent 
expenditures was constitutional because it attempted to eradicate the distortion caused in 
campaign success from corporate funding. In 2010, the Court found that this “anti-
distortion rationale” could eventually eliminate media corporations from spending for 
political purposes because their support distorts campaign success. While not a 
significant reason in its decision, the Court uses potential consequences of upholding 
precedent to bolster its decision to abandon it.  
Similarly, in South Dakota v. Wayfair, the Court decided to allow State taxation of e-
commerce businesses because of the consequences faced by States without this income. 
Justice Kennedy wrote: 
This expansion has also increased the revenue shortfall faced by States seeking to 
collect their sales and use taxes. In 1992,  it was estimated that the States were 
losing between $694 million and $3 billion per year in sales tax revenues as a 
result of the physical presence rule. Now estimates range from $8 to $33 billion. 
The South Dakota Legislature has declared an emergency, which again 
demonstrates urgency of overturning the physical presence rule.188 
 
Because States have already faced severe negative consequences as a result of the 
expansion of Internet businesses with no physical presence in any state, the Court feels 
compelled to address the results of their own decisions in Quill Corporation v. North 
Dakota and National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois. Justice Kennedy 
further alludes to a potential increase in losses suffered by States if the Court does not 
overturn its precedents. While, again, the Court does not rely entirely on potential 
consequences as a reason for abandoning stare decisis, its acts as a catalyst for action due 
to potential harm suffered at the hands of the Court’s inaction. 
 
188 South Dakota, 138 S. Ct. at 2097.  
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Conclusion 
Although the Roberts Court had fewer cases than the Courts before it, it presented 
many justifications for overturning precedent. All cases, except for Obergefell v. Hodges, 
presented several arguments for abandoning its revered doctrine of stare decisis. 
Interesting, this era also presents the most discussion of stare decisis as an abstract 
doctrine. With the exception of Obergefell, every case mentions its philosophy behind 
stare decisis, and why it is not as relevant in the present case as it normally would. As the 
Courts become more and more recent, it mentions its motivations and justifications in 
more depth. This could be a result of many things, but two reasons that I find convincing 
are 1) the publication of the Court’s decisions and 2) the increasing scrutiny of the Court 
as an institution. Both of these reasons hint at the Court’s metamorphosis as an institution 
as a result of public criticism. In fact, empirical research from lead political scientists and 
legal scholars, Lee Epstein, William Landes and Adam Liptak, confirms that Supreme 
Court Justices take the criticisms of prior precedent or their own precedents seriously.189 
However, my prior chapters demonstrates that this is not a novel, nor an unjustified 
concern. 
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CONCLUSION 
My research reveals five main findings. Firstly, the theory of stare decisis appears 
very differently than the practice of it. For example, vertical stare decisis is seldomly, if 
ever, questioned by legal scholars. It is often thought to be a nonquestion: lower courts 
must obey the decisions adjudicated by higher courts. However, my research into 
horizontal stare decisis shows this to be less accurate than originally believed. Many 
Supreme Court decisions that overturn a prior ruling indicate that the lower courts’ 
negative opinions of or sometimes outright refusal to abide by Supreme Court decisions 
as a factor in their decision to overturn the negatively viewed precedent.  
Secondly, the Supreme Court highly values the acceptance of their decisions into 
society. If a decision disobeys the values and traditions of society, public opinion can, 
and often does, persuade the Court to overrule it. Each modern iteration of the Supreme 
Court (Warren through Roberts) mentioned the opinions of legal scholars and public 
criticisms as justifications for overturning precedent.  
Thirdly, the doctrine of stare decisis is often viewed as a tool of convenience by the 
Justices. Many Justices appear inconsistent on their views of stare decisis. Justices rarely 
make their evaluations of precedent clear and continue to abide by those criteria in future 
cases.  
Fourthly, however, the Supreme Court Justices clearly understand the strength of 
stare decisis. In fact, the Supreme Court most frequently cites precedent, whether it be 
prior to the overruled one or subsequent to it, as justification for reversing precedent. 
Precedent is clearly a persuasive argument to abandon a prior Supreme Court decision to 
the public and to the Justices themselves.  
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Lastly, the relationship between the Supreme Court’s precedent and its legitimacy is 
important in the Supreme Court’s decision-making process. According to Professor Tara 
Grove of William and Mary Law School, the Supreme Court is well-aware of the public’s 
impact on its legitimacy and power.190 Perhaps the Court’s knowledge of the fact that its 
legitimacy rests largely on public opinion drives the use and strength of stare decisis as a 
doctrine within the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. However, that does not deprive the 
doctrine of its other strengths. Stare decisis has the ability to reduce divisiveness within 
the Court and preserve the legitimacy of an essential American institution that balances 
the inherently political nature of the other two governmental branches.  
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